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I. INTRODUCTION 
The right to recover damages for emotional distress is firmly 
established in Minnesota law. l In 1886, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court first recognized this right in Keyes v. Minneapolis 
& St. Louis Railway.2 The court stated: -
The mental distress and anxiety which may be proven in ac-
tions for personal injuries is confined to such as is con-
nected with the bodily injury, and is fairly and reasonably 
the plain consequence of such injury. The mental anguish, 
like physical pain, to be taken into consideration in such 
cases, is confined to such as is endured by the plaintiff in 
consequence of a personal irtiury to himself.3 
1. Minnesota jury Instruction Guide (JIG) 155 covers personal injury damages 
and states that damages are recoverable for "[a]ny pain, disability, (disfigurement), 
(embarrassment), or emotional distress experienced ... up to the time of trial." MIN-
NESOTA PRACTICE, CIVILjURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES No. 155 at 141 (3d ed. 1986). JIG 
158 also recognizes the right to recover similar damages that the injured person "is 
reasonably certain to experience in the future." Id. No. 158, at 147. 
2. 36 Minn. 290, 30 N.W. 888 (1886). 
3. [d. at 293, 30 N.W. at 889. In Keyes, the plaintiff sought to recover damages 
caused by the defendant's obstruction of a public highway. The plaintiff testified that 
his greatest anxiety in attempting to extract his horses from a barbwire obstruction 
was not for himself but for his wife and daughter, who were in the carriage while he 
attempted to free his horses. The admission of that evidence was assigned as error 
by the defendant following a verdict for the plaintiff. Although the court found that 
the evidence ofthe plaintiff's anxiety for his wife and daughter should not have been 
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Again, in 1916, in Patterson v. Blatti,4 the Minnesota Supreme 
Court said that "it is well settled that in an action for personal 
injury, mental suffering reasonably certain to be endured in 
the future may be taken into account in estimating damage."5 
The Patterson court also considered whether damages for emo-
tional distress arising from a disfigurement were recoverable. 
The court noted that the decisions in other jurisdictions were 
in "hopeless conflict" as to whether "humiliation or mortifica-
tion to arise in the future on account of disfigurement of a per-
son is a proper element of damage."6 However, having 
recognized that damages for mental suffering in a personal in-
jury claim are recoverable, the court saw no reason to treat 
mental suffering consisting of humiliation or mortification 
differently: 
The cause is in no sense uncertain. It is no more intangible 
or difficult of proof than is mental suffering in general. The 
fact that it may survive the physical pain does not seem to us 
decisive as long as it has its inception with the physical in-
jury. We hold that it was proper for the court to instruct the 
jury that they might take into account the humiliation, if 
any, from permanent disfigurement of person.7 
Despite these unequivocal statements, many questions re-
main unanswered. The recovery of damages for emotional dis-
tress is subject to varying and perhaps seemingly inconsistent 
standards. Recovery may depend on whether a claim is based 
on negligence or an intentional tort. Recovery may also de-
pend on whether the emotional distress arose from the com-
mission of a recognized tort, a statutory violation, or forms the 
sole basis of the claim. Likewise, recovery in accident cases de-
admitted, the court concluded that the admission of the evidence did not constitute 
prejudicial error. [d., 30 N.W. at 889-90. 
4. 133 Minn. 23, 157 N.W. 717 (1916). 
5. Id. at 27, 157 N.W. at 718 (citing Cooper v. St. Paul City Ry., 54 Minn. 379, 
56 N.W. 42 (1893); Johnson v. Northern Pac. R.R., 47 Minn. 430, 50 N.W. 473 
(1891». Cooper and Johnson dealt specifically with the right of an expert to form an 
opinion based in part on the statements made to a physician by a patient. In these 
decisions, the court held that such opinions are admissible. Cooper, 54 Minn. at 383, 
56 N.W. at 43; Johnson, 47 Minn. at 432,50 N.W. at 474. 
6. 133 Minn. at 25, 157 N.W. at 718. 
7. !d. at 27,157 N.W. at 718. Patterson was reaffirmed in Carlson v. Naddy, 181 
Minn. 180,232 N.W. 3 (1930), where the defendant claimed that damages for humili-
ation were recoverable even when disfigurement was concealed by clothing. [d. at 
182,232 N.W. at 4. The court concluded that such evidence determined the amount 
of damages, not whether damages should be recoverable. [d. 
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pends on whether the claimant suffered physical injury, was in 
the zone of danger but not injured, or was simply a bystander 
who was neither injured nor threatened with physical injury. 
This Article will examine the right to recover damages for 
emotional distress in Minnesota, with emphasis on claims for 
negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Af-
ter a brief history of emotional distress law, this Article will 
discuss claims for emotional distress based on negligence, in-
tentional torts, and statutory violations. These areas are ex-
amined in detail to determine the standards for the recovery of 
emotional harm in Minnesota and to evaluate whether the 
standards are applied consistently. The Article also examines 
the right to recover damages for emotional distress in specific 
contexts, including contractual disputes, professional malprac-
tice, and business torts. 
II. NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
In cases where the plaintiff is physically injured by the de-
fendant's negligence, the plaintiff will clearly be entitled to re-
cover for the past and future mental anguish suffered as a 
result of those injuries. Over the past one hundred years, the 
primary issue in determining recovery in negligence cases has 
been whether the plaintiff was in the zone of danger. A secon-
dary issue, and one that calls into question the legitimacy of 
the zone of danger rule, is whether a plaintiff who neither suf-
fers nor is threatened by physical injury may recover for emo-
tional distress. 
In 1892, the Minnesota Supreme Court questioned whether 
emotional distress alone is a sufficient injury to justify recov-
ery. In Purcell v. St. Paul City Railway,8 the plaintiff, a passenger 
in one of defendant's streetcars, alleged that she suffered "sud-
den fright and reasonable fear of immediate death or great 
bodily injury" when the defendant's street car negligently 
crossed in front of a cable train.9 The shock suffered by the 
plaintiff "threw her into violent convulsions, and caused ... a 
miscarriage, and subsequent illness."lO The defendant de-
murred to the complaint. 
The court never reached a conclusion to its initial inquiry, 
8. 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892). 
9. Id. at 137, 50 N.W. at 1034. 
10. Id. 
HeinOnline -- 19 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 5 1993
1993] EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 5 
finding that the plaintiff had suffered "physical injury, as seri-
ous, certainly, as would be the breaking of an arm or a leg."ll 
Instead, most of the court's opinion focused on whether the 
defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the plain-
tiff's i~uries: 
[I]f the fright was the natural consequence of.-was brought 
about, caused by-the circumstances of peril and alarm in 
which defendant's negligence placed plaintiff, and the fright 
caused the nervous shock and convulsions and consequent 
illness, the negligence was the proximate cause of those in-
juries. That a mental condition or operation on the part of 
the one injured comes between the negligence and injury 
does not necessarily break the required sequence of inter-
mediate causes. . . . The defendant suggested that plain-
tiff's pregnancy rendered her more susceptible to 
groundless alarm, and accounts more naturally and fairly 
than defendant's negligence for the injurious consequences. 
Certainly a woman in her condition has as good a right to 
be carried as anyone, and is entitled to at least as high a 
degree of care on the part of the carrier. . .. If the recovery 
of a passenger in feeble health were to be limited to what he 
would have been entitled to had he been sound, then, in 
case of a destruction by fire or wrecking of a railroad car 
through the negligence of those in charge of it, if all the 
passengers but one were able to leave it in time to escape 
injury, and that one could not because sick or lame, he 
could not recover at all. The suggestion mentioned would, 
if carried to its logical consequences, lead to such a 
conclusion. 12 
Thus, Purcell adopted the zone of danger rule, waiving any 
requirement of an actual impact to sustain the claim for mental 
anguish. The Purcell court also imposed the requirement that a 
physical manifestation must arise from the mental anguish. 13 
Minnesota thus took the lead in extending a plaintiff's right to 
recover in negligence actions where the emotional distress was 
not accompanied by physical impact. The next two sections of 
this Article analyze the zone of danger and the physical injury 
requirements in more depth. Part A analyzes the zone of dan-
ger requirement; Part B analyzes the physical injury 
requirement. 
11. /d. 
12. Id. at 138-39, 50 N.W. at 1035. 
13. Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry., 48 Minn. 134, 137, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892). 
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A. The Zone of Danger Requirement 
The zone of danger issue raises several questions. First, and 
most significant, is whether the requirement is confined only to 
the risk of physical injury. Second, is whether a plaintiff in the 
zone of danger must fear for her own safety or whether fear for 
the safety of another will suffice. Third, is whether the zone of 
danger limitation should give way to a bystander recovery rule. 
The fourth issue concerns the "direct victim" standard and 
asks whether the standard would be appropriate for some 
cases, even if the Minnesota Supreme Court continues to ad-
here to the zone of danger rule. This section examines the 
zone of danger requirement as it has been applied by the Min-
nesota courts. 
1. The Zone of Physical Danger? 
In 1969, in Okrina v. Midwestern COrp.,14 the Minnesota 
Supreme Court adhered to the Purcell rule but expressed con-
cern about compensating a person whose injuries are "the re-
sult of unusual sensitivity or susceptibility to shock."15 The 
plaintiff in Okrina was almost hit when a wall collapsed near a 
construction site. Immediately prior to the collapse, she heard 
what sounded like a bomb. Having witnessed the fall of the 
wall, the plaintiff thought the entire building would collapse. 
Although she escaped without being hit by any of the debris, 
the plaintiff "became sick and numb" immediately after the ac-
cident and was hospitalized for five days.16 Afterward, she had 
chronic pain in her head, back, and leg. Her personality 
changed. Her doctor attributed her condition to the emotional 
shock caused by the wall collapse. 17 
The defendant argued that the plaintiff's injury could not 
have been reasonably foreseen. The court replied, however, 
that "foreseeability is a test of negligence and not of damages. 
If a defendant can foresee some harm to one to whom he owes 
a duty, the exact nature and extent of the harm need not be 
foreseeable to permit recovery for all of the damages proxi-
mately caused."18 Since failing to shore up the wall properly 
14. 282 Minn. 400, 165 N.W.2d 259 (1969). 
15. [d. at 405, 165 N.W.2d at 263. 
16. [d. at 403, 165 N.W.2d at 262. 
17. [d. 
18. /d. at 405, 165 N.W.2d at 263. 
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amounted to negligence, the defendant could have foreseen 
some risk of injury. Further, the court stated that the "defend-
ant had a duty to foresee some harm to plaintiff by the collapse 
of a wall supporting a building occupied by her .... "19 The 
court found that it would be unusual if a person in the plain-
tiff's position did not suffer severe shock from the experience. 
Thus, because injury was foreseeable and the defendant was 
negligent, the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to re-
cover, "notwithstanding her unusual susceptibility to the con-
sequences of her fear .... "20 
In Stadler v. Cross,21 parents of a child struck by the defend-
ants' pickup truck alleged that they suffered emotional distress 
with physical symptoms, even though they were not in the zone 
of danger at the time their child was injured. The mother, 
standing only a few yards from the road, heard the screeching 
of the pickup truck's brakes and turned to see her son fly 
through the air and hit the pavement. The father, approxi-
mately 100 yards away, heard the accident and realized when 
he arrived at the scene that it was his son who was hit. 22 
The sole issue in Stadler was whether Minnesota should ex-
tend the zone of danger rule to allow bystander recovery. The 
court found that long-established policy dictated adherence to 
the zone of danger rule: 
A person's liability for the consequences of her or his ac-
tions cannot be unlimited. The limits imposed must be as 
workable, reasonable, logical, and just as possible. If the 
limits cannot be consistently and meaningfully applied by 
courts and juries, then the imposition of liability would be-
come arbitrary and capricious. Consequently, the cause of 
just apportionment of the losses would suffer. . . . Under 
the zone-of-danger rule the courts and juries can objectively 
determine whether plaintiffs were within the zone of dan-
ger. Furthermore, plaintiffs can be cross-examined regard-
ing whether their fear was for themselves or for another. 
None of the other proposed limitations can be as readily 
and consistently applied.23 
The court concluded that the line-drawing problems presented 
19. Okrina v. Midwestern Corp., 282 Minn. 400, 406, 165 N.W.2d 259, 264 
(1969). 
20. Id. 
21. 295 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1980). 
22. Id. at 553. 
23. Id. at 554. 
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by the bystander recovery rule could not be overcome, thus 
ensuring that the zone of danger rule would continue to be the 
law in Minnesota.24 
In 1982, the Minnesota Supreme Court refused yet another 
opportunity to expand the bases allowing for recovery in negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress claims. In Langeland v. 
Farmers State Bank,25 plaintiff landowners lost their right to re-
deem their farm from mortgage foreclosure because the de-
fendants' misinterpreted the redemption statute. The plaintiffs 
sought, inter alia, to recover for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress.26 The defendants included Farmers State 
Bank, the bank~s president, the bank's attorney, and one of the 
judgment creditors and its attorney.27 
In arguing to the court, the plaintiffs relied on a California 
appellate decision. In Jarchow v. Transamenca Title Insurance 
Co. ,28 the California Court of Appeals allowed a plaintiff to re-
cover damages for emotional distress that occurred when a ti-
tle insurance company failed to discover two easements on the 
plaintiff's property. The title insurance company's negligence 
resulted in litigation expenses and financial hardship.29 The 
court of appeals held that "courts may adjudicate negligence 
claims for mental distress when sufficient guarantees of genui-
ness [sic] are found in the facts of the case, e.g., when the 
plaintiff has suffered substantial damage apart from the alleged 
emotional injury."gO 
The plaintiffs in Langeland claimed that the loss of title to 
their farm resulted in illness, marital problems, problems in 
obtaining credit, and public embarrassment and humiliation 
for them and their children.g1 Further, Gerald Langeland 
24. The court noted other potential. but nondispositive. justifications for the 
limitation: 
Other factors frequently considered in these cases but which we do not 
consider dispositive in light of the problems with limiting liability include 
the fear of a proliferation of claims. the potential for fraudulent claims. the 
foreseeability of the injury. and unduly burdensome liability. 
Id. at 555 n.3 (citations omitted). 
25. 319 N.W.2d 26. 30 (Minn. 1982). 
26. /d. 
27. /d. at 29. 
28. 122 Cal. Rptr. 470 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975). overruled by Soto v. Royal Globe Ins. 
Co .• 229 Cal. Rptr. 192 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
29. Jarchow. 122 Cal. Rptr. at 486. 
30. [d. at 484 (citation omitted). 
31. Langeland. 319 N.W.2d at 29. 
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claimed that he was unable to work. S2 The Langelands sought 
neither medical advice nor counseling for their problems. ss 
The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected their claim: 
The Langelands' only injury beyond their claimed emo-
tional distress is attorneys fees expended in having the cer-
tificate set aside. Were we to adopt the Jarchow rule, it is 
possible that this expense could constitute "substantial 
damage" sufficient to sustain the additional claim for emo-
tional distress. However, we decline to do so. We have 
consistently held that no cause of action exists for the negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress absent either physical 
injury or physical danger to the plaintiff. S4 
Leaon v. Washington County,S5 decided in 1986, discussed the 
right to recover damages for both negligent and intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress. In Leaon, a Washington County 
deputy sheriff was humiliated at a stag party organized by four 
deputies. When the plaintiff arrived late at the party, six men 
took him to the stage and forced him to lie down with a dollar 
bill in his mouth. A nude dancer touched her vagina to his face 
and removed the dollar bill from his mouth with her hand. 
The plaintiff, distressed and humiliated, left the party shortly 
thereafter. 
The incident gave rise to several claims by Leaon and his 
wife, including a claim for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress. 36 The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
court's denial of the plaintiffs' negligent infliction of emotional 
distress claim.s7 
In discussing the zone of danger requirement, the court held 
that a plaintiff who does not suffer a physical impact may "re-
cover for emotional disorders if plaintiff was within the scope of 
danger of the negligent act and if plaintiff exhibits physical mani-
festations of the emotional distress. "S8 The court held that 
Leaon's spouse's claim was barred because she was not in the 
zone of danger, and that Leaon's claim was barred because he 
was unable to show physical manifestations of emotional 
32. [d. 
33. [d. 
34. [d. at 32 (citations omitted). 
35. 397 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1986). 
36. [d. at 870. 
37. [d. at 874. 
38. /d. at 875 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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distress.39 
The court relied on Stadler v. Cross 40 in denying the plaintiffs' 
claims.41 However, in Stadler, the court had "recognized that a 
person within the zone of danger of physical impact who reasonably 
fears for his or her own safety" would be entitled to recover for 
severe emotional distress, if the distress resulted in physical 
injury.42 Similarly, Langeland required that the plaintiff be in 
"some personal physical danger caused by the defendant's neg-
ligence" before damages for emotional distress may be 
awarded.43 
Accordingly, Purcell and Langeland view the zone of danger 
issue narrowly, requiring a physical element to be in the zone 
of danger. But the language in Leaon has the potential to be 
broader, requiring the plaintiff to be in the zone of danger, not 
the zone of physical danger. However, Leaon may be recon-
ciled with Langeland because there were personal threats to 
Leaon's bodily integrity from the nude dancer and the police 
officers who physically forced him to lie down on the stage with 
the dollar bill in his mouth.44 Further, Leaon's complaint in-
cluded claims for false imprisonment and battery.45 On that 
basis, the claim for the negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress arguably placed the plaintiff in the zone of physical dan-
ITer. Thus, although the Leaon court's description of the zone 
of danger requirement appears broader than Langeland's, in ap-
plication, the court did not broaden the requirement because 
Leaon was arguably in the zone of physical danger. The court 
of appeals has adhered to the supreme court's guidelines,46 
with an implied potential extension in State v. Tonka Corp. ,47 for 
39. Id. 
40. 295 N.W.2d 552, 553 (Minn. 1980). 
41. Leaon, 397 N.W.2d 867, 875 (Minn. 1986). 
42. Stadler, 295 N.W.2d at 553 (emphasis added). 
43. Langeland v. Farmers State Bank, 319 N.W.2d 26,31 (Minn. 1982) (empha-
sis added). 
44. Leaon, 397 N.W.2d at 869. 
45. Id. at 869-70. 
46. See, e.g., Bohdan v. Alltool Mfg., Co., 411 N.W.2d 902 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). 
47. 420 N.W.2d 624 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), review denied, (Minn. May 4, 1988). 
The Woykes brought suit against Tonka for negligent disposal of hazardous sub-
stances on their property. They sued both for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress and personal injury. !d. at 627. In reviewing the trial court's dismissal of the 
emotional distress claim, the Minnesota Court of Appeals noted the limitation on 
claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress to cases where the plaintiff is 
within the zone of danger and exhibits physical manifestations caused by the emo-
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emotional harm that results from pollution. 
2. Where Emotional Harm is the Product of Fear for Another's 
Safety 
The general rule in Minnesota requires that a plaintiff in or-
der to recover for emotional distress must be in the zone of 
danger. Courts have refused to extend recovery to plaintiffs 
who simply fear that another will sustain injury. The require-
ment that emotional distress claimants fear for their own safety 
is based on the continued repetition of the requirements of an 
emotional distress claim since they were first established in 
Purcell.48 Although Minnesota courts have had ample opportu-
nity to consider adopting a "bystander recovery" rule, the 
courts have rigidly adhered to the zone of danger rule. 
In 1991, in Silberstein v. Cordie, 49 the court of appeals held 
that the issue of whether family members were in the zone of 
danger when the husband and father of the family was mur-
dered in the family home was a question for the jury.50 The 
case arose out of the brutal murder of Delton Silberstein by a 
mentally ill individual, Randy Cordie.51 Silberstein was mur-
dered in his home when his wife and children were present in 
the home, but in a different room.52 
tional distress. There was no medical evidence of the emotional distress the plaintiffs 
claimed, and, absent that showing, the court of appeals held that recovery for negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress "is not usually appropriate." [d. 
The Woykes also argued that their claim for emotional distress could be based 
upon an "implied finding of nuisance." [d. That claim was rejected because a claim 
of nuisance simply describes a type of damage, rather than a cause of action. /d. 
Where the acts or omissions constituting negligence are the same that give rise to the 
claim for nuisance, the rules applicable to negligence apply. /d. (citing Randall v. 
Village of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81, 86, 103 N.W. 131,135 (1960». The court thus 
disallowed the plaintiffs' claim for emotional distress by application of the same rules 
applicable to the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. And although 
the plaintiffs would be entitled to a separate finding on their nuisance claim, the 
physical manifestation requirement still barred recovery. [d. at 627-28. 
Thus, by precluding the Woykes from recovering emotional distress damages 
under the physical injury requirement, it is implicit that the court found them to be in 
the zone of danger. Consequently, because the defendant's conduct involved pollu-
tion, the Tonka court may have expanded the zone of danger requirement temporally. 
That is, Tonka did not involve a sudden incident as in Langeland and Leaon, but rather 
a continuing practice resulting in emotional distress. 
48. Purcell v. St Paul City Ry., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892). 
49. 474 N.W.2d 850 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). 
50. [d. at 856-57. 
51. [d. at 853. 
52. [d. 
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Bonnie Silberstein and her two minor children were within 
the physical zone of danger. Though Bonnie and her chil-
dren did not see the shooting, they heard the five gunshots. 
Moreover, during the shooting spree, Cordie, armed with 
the shotgun, twice entered the bedroom where Bonnie and 
the children were. While Cordie was in the bedroom, Bon-
nie testified she was "filled with terror" personally and 
feared for the safety of her children. Under these circum-
stances, questions of fact exist whether Bonnie and her chil-
dren reasonably feared for their safety.5!1 
Although not at issue in the case, whether Bonnie Silberstein 
feared for her own safety or that of her children should be ir-
relevant under the circumstances. This analysis suggests a 
slight modification of the Purcell rule as it has carried forward 
to include cases where the emotional injury in a negligence 
case includes claims where the claimant fears for the safety of 
others, if the claimant is in the zone of danger. 
Application of existing Minnesota proximate cause princi-
ples could justify recovery in those cases without conflicting 
with the zone of danger cases such as Stadler and Purcell. 
In Christianson v. Chicago, St. P., M & O. Ry., 54 the Minnesota 
Supreme Court formulated a direct consequences rule for 
resolving proximate cause issues: 
What a man may reasonably anticipate is important, and 
may be decisive, in determining whether an act is negligent, 
but is not at all decisive in determining whether that act is 
the proximate cause of an injury which ensues. If a person 
had no reasonable ground to anticipate that a particular act 
would or might result in injury to anybody, then, of course, 
the act would not be negligent at all; but, if the act itself is 
negligent, then the person guilty of it is equally liable for all 
its natural and proximate consequences, whether he could 
have foreseen them or not. Otherwise expressed, the law is 
53. Id. at 856-57. The court elaborated in a footnote: 
Cordie's irrational conduct plainly extended the contours of the zone of 
danger to include the children's bedroom. During the gruesome events, 
Cordie told Bonnie Silberstein that her husband had killed thirty people; he 
also quoted scripture and tossed a Bible on her child's bed; and he said he 
must cut out Delton's liver to prove Delton was a woman disguised as a man. 
Further, Cordie told Bonnie not to be "grossed out" by the brains or "guts 
hanging out," that the blood was not real, that Delton would be on the 
street tommorrow [sic] in disguise, and that he would have to shoot him 
again. 
Id. at 856 n.3. 
54. 67 Minn. 94, 69 N.W. 640 (1896). 
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that if the act is one which the party ought, in the exercise of 
ordinary care, to have anticipated was liable to result in in-
jury to others, then he is liable for any injury proximately 
resulting from it, although he could not have anticipated 
the particular injury which did happen. Consequences 
which follow in unbroken sequence, without an intervening 
efficient cause, from the original negligent act, are natural 
and proximate; and for such consequences the original 
wrongdoer is responsible, even though he could not have 
foreseen the particular results which did follow. 55 
13 
The Christianson approach has been reaffirmed many times, in-
cluding in Okrina.56 Application of this approach to cases 
where the claimant claims emotional distress as a result of wit-
nessing injury to another results in the following argument: 
The plaintiff was in the zone of danger. She reasonably 
feared for her own safety. She suffered severe emotional 
distress that was the product of fear for herself or the safety 
of a family member. The distress resulted in physical harm 
within the meaning of Okrina. Because emotional harm and 
resultant physical injury were foreseeable under the circum-
stances, it is irrelevant if the defendant was unable to fore-
see the exact manner of occurrence. 
This result has some support in case law, including the 1923 
English case of Hambrook v. Stokes Brothers.57 In Hambrook, the 
court said: 
[W]hat a man ought to have anticipated is material when 
considering the extent of his duty. . . . [T]he defendant 
ought to have anticipated that if his lorry ran away down 
this narrow street, it might terrify some woman to such an 
extent, through fear of some immediate bodily injury to 
herself, that she would receive such a mental shock as would 
injure her health. Can any real distinction be drawn from 
the point of view of what the defendant ought to have antic-
ipated and what, therefore, his duty was, between that case 
and the case of a woman whose fear is for her child, and not 
for herself? Take a case in point as a test. Assume two 
mothers crossing this street at the same time when this lorry 
comes thundering down, each holding a small child by the 
hand. One mother is courageous and devoted to her child. 
She is terrified, but thinks only of the damage to her child, 
55. Id. at 97, 69 N.W. at 641. 
56. Okrina v. Midwestern Corp., 282 Minn. 400, 165 N.W.2d 259 (1969). 
57. I K.B. 141 (1925). 
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and not at all about herself. The other woman is timid and 
lacking in the motherly instinct. She also is terrified, but 
thinks only of the damage to herself and not at all about her 
child. The health of both mothers is seriously affected by 
the mental shock occasioned by the fright. Can any distinc-
tion be drawn between the two cases? Will the law recog-
nize a cause of action in the case of the less deserving 
mother, and none in the case of the more deserving one? 
Does the law say that the defendant ought reasonably to 
have anticipated the non-natural feeling of the timid 
mother, and not the natural feeling of the courageous 
mother? I think not.58 
Section 436 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts also sup-
ports recovery: 
(1) If the actor's conduct is negligent as violating a duty of 
care designed to protect another from a fright or other 
emotional disturbance which the actor should recognize as 
involving an unreasonable risk of bodily harm, the fact that 
the harm results solely through the internal operation of the 
fright or other emotional disturbance does not protect the 
actor from liability. 
(2) If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unrea-
sonable risk of causing bodily harm to another otherwise 
than by subjecting him to fright, shock, or other similar and 
immediate emotional disturbance, the fact that such harm 
results solely from the internal operation of fright or other 
emotional disturbance does not protect the actor from 
liability. 
(3) The rule stated in subsection (2) applies where the bod-
ily harm to the other results from his shock or fright at harm 
or peril to a member of his immediate family occurring in 
his presence. 59 
The Restatement's comments make it clear that the first sub-
section is applicable only in a narrow range of cases where 
the actor's conduct is intended or obviously likely to cause 
severe fright or other emotional disturbance, although it is 
not intended to cause the bodily harm which results from it. 
It applies only when the fright or emotional disturbance to 
which the actor intends to subject the other or to which he 
should realize the other is likely to be subjected, is such, 
because of its severe character, that a reasonable man would 
58. Id. at 156 (Bankes, LJ.). 
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 (1965). 
HeinOnline -- 19 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 15 1993
1993] EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
realize the likelihood that it might produce harmful physical 
60 consequences . . . . 
Comment f explains paragraph (3) of section 436: 
Under the rule stated in Subsection (3), that stated in Sub-
section (2) applies where the defendant's negligent conduct 
threatens bodily harm to the plaintiff through direct impact 
upon his person, or in some other way than through emo-
tional disturbance, and the bodily harm is brought about in-
stead by the plaintiff's emotional disturbance at the peril or 
harm of a third person. In such a case the defendant is sub-
ject to liability if the third person is a member of the plain-
tiff's immediate family, and the peril or harm to such a 
person occurs in the plaintiff's presence. In other words, 
the rule stated in Subsection (2) applies in such cases, even 
though the plaintiff's shock or fright is not due to any fear 
for his own safety, but to fear for the safety of his wife or 
child .... 61 
15 
In summary, both the Restatement and the Minnesota proxi-
mate cause decisions support recovery under a negligence the-
ory by a claimant who is in the zone of danger and fears for the 
safety of either herself or a family member. 
3. A Bystander Recovery Rule for Minnesota? 
In 1968, in Dillon v. Legg,62 the California Supreme Court es-
tablished guidelines for the recovery of damages by a by-
stander for the negligent infliction of emotional distress: 
We note, first, that we deal here with a case in which plain-
tiff suffered a shock which resulted in physical injury and we 
confine our ruling to that case. In determining, in such a 
case, whether defendant should reasonably foresee the in-
jury to plaintiff [mother], or in other terminology, whether 
defendant owes plaintiff a duty of due care, the courts will 
take into account such factors as the following: (1) Whether 
plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as con-
trasted with one who was a distance away from it. (2) 
Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact 
upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous ob-
servance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the 
accident from others after its occurrence. (3) Whether 
60. /d. § 436 cmt. a. 
61. Id. § 436 cmt. f. The illustration following comment f is drawn from 
Hambrook. 
62. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968). 
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plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as contrasted 
with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only 
a distant relationship .... 
In light of these factors the court will determine whether 
the accident and harm was reasonably foreseeable. Such rea-
sonable foreseeability does not turn on whether the particu-
lar defendant as an individual would have in actuality 
foreseen the exact accident and loss; it contemplates that 
courts, on a case-to-case basis, analyzing all the circum-
stances, will decide what the ordinary man under such cir-
cumstances should reasonably have foreseen. The courts 
thus mark out the areas of liability, excluding the remote 
and unexpected.63 
Subsequent decisions of the California Supreme Court and 
California Court of Appeals have expanded Dillon and relaxed 
the guidelines in order to avoid creating arbitrary limitations 
on the right to recover for the negligent infliction of emotional 
dis tres s. 64 
But the California courts' loose application of the Dillon 
guidelines prompted the California Supreme Court, in Thing v. 
La Chusa,65 to limit the right of a bystander to recover for neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress by solidifying the factors 
that were only guidelines in Dillon: 
We conclude, therefore, that a plaintiff may recover dam-
ages for emotional distress caused by observing the negli-
gently inflicted injury of a third person if, but only if, said 
plaintiff: (1) is closely related to the injury victim; (2) is 
present at the scene of the injury producing event at the 
time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to 
the victim; and (3) as a result suffers serious emotional dis-
tress-a reaction beyond that which would be anticipated in 
a disinterested witness and which is not an abnormal re-
sponse to the circumstances.66 
In one sense, La Chusa answers criticisms of the bystander 
recovery rule. The La Chusa court established rigid limitations 
on the right of a bystander to recover for emotional harm and 
created a rule that is easier to administer than one that simply 
uses the Dillon factors as "guidelines." Any court considering 
63. Id. at 920-21. 
64. For a discussion of the post-Dillon expansions, see Thing v. La Chusa, 771 
P.2d 814,821-25 (Cal. 1989). 
65. 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989). 
66. /d. at 829-30. 
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the bystander recovery rule profits from the California courts' 
past experience in applying the bystander recovery rule. 
In another sense, the rule adopted in La Chusa establishes 
yet another set of guidelines that will permit recovery in some 
bystander recovery cases but deny recovery in many others 
where the injury is as serious. For example, the limitation on 
recovery to plaintiffs who are closely related to the victim will 
foreclose recovery by any person who suffers serious emo-
tional harm but is not in a state-sanctioned relationship. The 
rule adopted by the court in La Chusa is a two-edged sword, 
permitting recovery in some cases, but arbitrarily denying it in 
others. The rule raises questions of fundamental fairness in 
the development and application of common law rules and ne-
cessitates an answer to the question of whether the rule should 
be extended to permit bystander recovery if the rule can only 
be applied arbitrarily. 
Irrespective of the position the Minnesota Supreme Court 
will ultimately take on the bystander recovery issue, a question 
remains as to whether recovery should be allowed when the 
plaintiff is not in the zone of danger but is a "direct victim" of 
negligent conduct by another and suffers emotional distress as 
a result of the breach. 
4. Direct Victim Recovery? 
The California Supreme Court adopted the "direct victim" 
theory of recovery in Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals.67 Suit 
in Molien arose from an alleged negligent diagnosis of syphilis 
in the plaintiff's wife.68 The plaintiff's wife became upset and 
suspected that her husband had engaged in extramarital af-
fairs.69 The tension and hostility that arose resulted in the 
breakup of their marriage.70 The plaintiff alleged that the de-
fendant doctors "knew or should have known their diagnosis 
that plaintiff's wife had syphilis and that he might also have the 
disease would cause him emotional distress."7l 
While Dillon presented an impediment to the plaintiff's re-
covery, the Molien court distinguished it: 
67. 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980). 
68. Id. at 814. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 814-15. 
71. Id. at 815. 
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It must be remembered, however, that in Dillon the plaintiff 
sought recovery of damages she suffered as a percipient wit-
ness to the injury of a third person, and the three guidelines 
there noted served as a limitation on that particular cause of 
action. Here, by contrast, plaintiff was himself a direct vic-
tim of the assertedly negligent act. By insisting that the 
present facts fail to satisfy the first and second of the Dillon 
criteria, defendants urge a rote application of the guidelines 
to a case factually dissimilar to the bystander scenario. In 
so doing, they overlook our explicit statement in Dillon that 
an obligation hinging on foreseeability "must necessarily be 
adjudicated only upon a case-by-case basis .... [N]o immu-
table rule can establish the extent of that obligation for 
every circumstance in the future." 
Hence the significance of Dillon for the present action lies 
not in its delineation of guidelines fashioned for resolution 
of the precise issue then before us; rather, we apply its gen-
eral principle of foreseeability to the facts at hand, much as 
we have done in other cases presenting complex questions 
of tort liability. 72 
Given the foreseeability of the harm, the court held that the 
defendants owed a duty to exercise care in diagnosing the 
plaintiff's wife's physical condition.73 Further, in allowing re-
covery, the court concluded that the risk of harm to the plain-
tiff was reasonably foreseeable and that the defendants' 
tortious conduct was directed toward the plaintiff and his 
wife.74 Thus, Molien established that, if a person suffering 
emotional distress is a "direct victim" of that distress, the Dil-
lon guidelines are inapplicable. 
Later, in Ochoa v. Superior Court,15 the California Supreme 
Court limited the Molien court's "direct victim" recovery to 
cases where the defendant's negligence is "by its very nature 
directed at" the plaintiff.76 At the same time, Ochoa expanded 
the right to recover damages for the negligent infliction of 
emotional distress by holding that the Dillon factors were only 
guidelines and satisfaction of the guidelines was not essential 
72. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 616 P.2d 813, 816-17 (Cal. 1980) (citing 
Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968». 
73. Id. The court also abandoned the physical irtiury requirement by holding 
that the plaintiff was not barred from recovery because he sustained no physical in-
jury. /d. at 819-21. 
74. Id. at 817. 
75. 703 P.2d I (Cal. 1985). 
76. Id. at 10. 
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to recovery. 77 
The status of the Molien "direct victim" standard has been 
tenuous. In Thing v. La Chusa,'s the California Supreme Court 
expressed its reservations with the "direct victim" standard but 
was not presented with an occasion to directly overrule Molien. 
More recently, in Burgess v. Superior Court,79 the court ac-
knowledged criticism of the "direct victim" approach in Molien, 
including its own criticism, but nonetheless reaffirmed Molien 
while attempting to provide more specific guidelines for the 
continued application of the "direct victim" approach.so 
The plaintiffs in Burgess were the mother of a child delivered 
by her obstetrician, the child, and the child's father. The child 
suffered permanent brain damage and injury to his central ner-
vous system because of oxygen deprivation during the course 
of the delivery, allegedly due to the negligence of the obstetri-
cian.S ) During the course of the litigation, the child died, al-
legedly from injuries sustained in the delivery. The parents 
subsequently instituted a wrongful death action that was con-
solidated with the plaintiffs' malpractice action. Adhering to 
La Chusa, the trial court granted the motion.s2 The court of 
appeals vacated the trial court's order, holding that La Chusa 
was inapplicable because Burgess, the mother, was a "direct 
victim" under Molien. s3 
In Burgess, the court reiterated its concern expressed in La 
Chusa: "foreseeability of the injury alone is not a useful 'guide-
line' or a meaningful restriction on the scope" of an action for 
the negligent infliction of emotional distress,s4 but the court 
noted that, unlike the facts in Ochoa and Molien, the plaintiff in 
Burgess was a " 'traditional' plaintiff with a professional negli-
gence cause of action."s5 Thus understood, the court charac-
terized the claim simply as "an ordinary professional 
malpractice claim, which seeks as an element of damage com-
77. [d. at 8. 
78. 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989). 
79. 831 P.2d 1197 (Cal. 1992). 
80. /d. at 1202. 
81. [d. at 1199. 
82. [d. 
83. Id. 
84. Burgess v. Superior Court, 831 P.2d 1197, 1201 (Cal. 1992) (quoting Thing, 
771 P.2d at 814). 
85. Burgess, 831 P.2d at 1202. 
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pensation for her serious emotional distress. "86 
In "direct victim" cases the plaintiff would be precluded 
from recovering because of inability to meet the prerequisites 
of La Chusa. The distinction is illustrated in Burgess in a foot-
note discussion of the father's claim in cases involving negli-
gent prenatal care of his child: 
We note ... that the physician-patient relationship critical 
to a mother's cause of action is almost always absent in a 
father's claim. It, therefore, appears that a father must meet 
the criteria set forth in La Chusa if he is to state a viable 
claim.87 
86. Id. at 1203. The court drew a parallel to its earlier decision in Marlene F. v. 
Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc., 770 P.2d 278 (Cal. 1989). In Marlene F., the 
court permitted recovery of damages for emotional distress by a mother whose son 
was molested by a therapist who was treating both mother and son for intrafamily 
problems. The action of the therapist constituted a breach of a direct duty to the 
mother under circumstances where the emotional injury was foreseeable. Marlene F., 
831 P.2d at 1203. For a good discussion of Marlene F., its implications, and sugges-
tions for building on the approach in direct victim actions, see Julie A. Davies, Direct 
Actions/or Emotional Harm: Is Compromise Possible?, 67 U. WASH. L. REV. I (1992). 
The Burgess court also confronted its own rule precluding recovery of damages 
for the loss of filial consortium, holding that the rule should not bar the plaintiff's 
claim for damages for emotional distress but that it should limit her recovery: 
While some portion of Burgess' emotional distress may have arisen from her 
loss of Joseph's consortium, other portions of her emotional distress may 
have separate, distinct origins that would not subject damages for these por-
tions of her emotional distress to a bar mandated by the policy concerns 
underlying the prohibition of the loss of filial consortium claim. Thus, we 
hold that damages arising from loss of Joseph's affection, society, compan-
ionship, love and disruption of Burgess' "normal" routine oflife to care for 
Joseph cannot be recovered by Burgess no matter how her claim for these 
damages is denominated. We believe that this limitation on recovery elimi-
nates the possibility of duplicative recovery by Burgess for damages which 
may be recovered by her child. We further hold to the extent, however, that 
Burgess's emotional distress arose from the "abnormal event" of participat-
ing in a negligent delivery and reacting to the unexpected outcome of her 
pregnancy with resulting" 'fright, nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, morti-
fication, shock, humiliation and indignity, as well as physical pain resulting 
from defendant's breach of duty, then Burgess's [sic] emotional distress is of 
the type for which we have previously recognized recovery should be pro-
vided and is distinguishable from the type of emotional distress for which 
recovery is prohibited by virtue of the policy considerations underlying the 
prohibition of filial consortium claims. 
Burgess, 831 P.2d at 1208-09 (citations omitted). 
87. Id. at 1204 n.8 (citations omitted). Mrozka v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Min-
neapolis, 482 N.W.2d 806 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), review denied, (Minn. May 24, 1992), 
is a good example of a Minnesota case where the claim might be denied under a 
direct victim standard. The parents in the case sustained emotional injury and sued 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Had they sued for negligent infliction 
of emotional distress, they would not have met the zone of danger rules established 
by the Minnesota Supreme Court because they were clearly outside the zone of physi-
cal danger. The parents also would not have met the Burgess guidelines for the recov-
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The Minnesota Supreme Court has considered exceptions to 
the zone of danger rule. Whether the Minnesota Supreme 
Court would adopt the approach suggested by the California 
Supreme Court in Burgess is unclear. In Langeland v. Farmers 
State Bank,88 landowners sued for losses incurred because of a 
mortgage foreclosure.89 The plaintiffs brought, inter alia, a 
negligent infliction of emotional distress claim.90 . The court 
refused to follow California's lead, noting that "[w]ere we to 
adopt the [California] rule, it is possible that this expense 
could constitute 'substantial damage' sufficient to sustain the 
additional claim for emotional distress. However, we decline 
to do SO."91 
The supreme court opinion in Langeland does not appear, in 
effect, to completely rule out the possibility of a negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress claim in cases other than those 
involving actual physical injury or the threat of injury to the 
plaintiff.92 In either, the physical disability requirement must 
be met.93 The problem is in defining the types of cases where 
negligent infliction claims will be recognized without the zone 
of danger requirement. 
It is important to note that the California rule the Minnesota 
Supreme Court rejected in Langeland was not the rule the court 
formulated in Burgess, a rule that both permited and limited di-
rect victim recovery. Thus, the possibility still exists for the 
Minnesota Supreme Court to adopt the Burgess approach, even 
if it adheres to the basic zone of danger/physical formulation 
as the standard for resolving negligent infliction of emotional 
distress cases. 
Langeland is arguably overinclusive insofar as it results in the 
denial of recovery in cases where a breach of an underlying 
obligation owed by the defendant to the claimant, unless the 
claimant is able to establish that she is in the zone of danger or 
suffers physical injury. That means that, in any case where the 
ery of emotional harm because no relationship existed between the Church and 
parents to justify a finding of duty and to support recovery of damages for the emo-
tional harm sustained. . 
88. 319 N.W.2d 26 (Minn. 1982). 
89. !d. at 28-29. 
90. Id. at 31. 
91. [d. at 32. 
92. Langeland, 319 N.W.2d at 32. 
93. Langeland v. Farmers State Bank, 319 N.W.2d 26, 32 (Minn. 1982). 
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primary harm suffered is economic harm, there cannot be re-
covery for emotional distress unless the claimant establishes 
the zone of danger requirements or the elements of a section 
46 c1aim.94 Yet, there may be a variety of cases where the de-
fendant has acted negligently and caused emotional injury to 
the claimant but has caused no physical harm. Putting aside 
the requirement that physical injury arise out of the emotional 
distress for the moment, rigid adherence to the zone of danger 
rules will prohibit recovery even in situations where the de-
fendant owes a duty to the plaintiff and has breached that duty. 
A broader rule in the "direct victim" cases, such as Burgess, 
would permit Minnesota courts to analyze the issue of whether 
recovery should be granted by using the same policy factors 
used to analyze duty cases in general. 95 
B. The Physical Injury Requirement 
In analyzing the physical injury requirement of negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress claims, two questions arise: (1) 
How should the standard be applied after Purcell; and (2) Is the 
requirement still reasonable in light of its abandonment in 
other jurisdictions. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court's 1980 decision in Stadler 96 
seemed to change the physical injury requirement. Even 
though the court adhered to the zone of danger requirement, 
the court stated, "[w]e have recognized that a person within 
the zone of danger of physical impact who reasonably fears for 
his or her own safety and who consequently suffers severe 
emotional distress with resultant physical injury may re-
cover. "97 Thus, the court appeared to add a requirement of 
"severe emotional distress" to the equation, an element that 
neither Purce1l 98 nor Okrina 99 appear to have required. 
94. See infra Part lILA. 
95. See, e.g., Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165 (Minn. 1989) (holding 
that a commercial parking ramp owner-operator owes a dUly to its customers to pro-
tect them from criminal assaults, based on existence of a special relationship); Mad-
sen v. Park Nicollet Medical Ctr., 414 N.W.2d 399 (Minn. 1987) (refusing to extend 
right to recover under informed consent theory to genetic counseling cases and limit-
ing the informed consent rule to cases where the plaintiff's physical integrity is vio-
lated); Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1982) (denying recovery for loss 
of parental consortium). 
96. Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1980). 
97. /d. at 553. 
98. Purcell v. Sc Paul City Ry., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892). 
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While the difference in the court's language could be merely 
semantics, the Stadler decision could command greater weight, 
particularly in cases where the emotional injury appears to be 
minor but the physical consequences are substantial. Perhaps 
it is fair to say that, in any situation where there are physical 
manifestations of the emotional injury, the emotional injury 
will undoubtedly be deemed severe. 
The severe emotional distress requirement was applied in 
Leaon,loo where the plaintiff was subjected to ridicule and hu-
miliation at a stag party but was barred from asserting a claim 
for the negligent infliction of emotional distress: 
Here the trial court ruled that Donald Leaon failed to show 
physical manifestations of emotional distress. . . . Donald 
Leaon testified he lost weight (later regained), became de-
pressed, and exhibited feelings of anger, fear, and bitter-
ness. These symptoms do not satisfy the physical 
manifestations test, a test designed to assure the genuine-
ness of the alleged emotional distress. 101 
The Leaon court contrasted the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
decision in Q;till v. Trans- World Airlines, Inc. 102 In Quill, the 
plaintiff suffered emotional distress when the commercial air-
plane in which he was riding suddenly rolled over and plunged 
downward, at just below the speed of sound, in a tailspin that 
lasted forty seconds.103 Five seconds before impact, the pilot 
managed to pull the airplane out of the tailspin. 104 The G 
force on the plaintiff was so strong that he was unable to reach 
the oxygen mask above his head. l05 The noise was extremely 
loud. After the pilot pulled the airplane out of the tailspin the 
plane continued to shake for the next forty minutes. l06 The 
crew advised the passengers on emergency landing 
procedures. 107 
The court of appeals in Q;till recognized that the Minnesota 
cases did not answer the narrower question of how severely the 
99. Okrina v. Midwestern Corp., 282 Minn. 400, 165 N.W.2d 259 (1969). 
100. Leaon v. Washington County, 397 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1986). 
101. [d. at 875. 
102. 361 N.W.2d 438 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), review denied, (Minn. Apr. 18, 1985). 
103. [d. at 440. 
104. [d. 
105. [d. 
106. [d. 
107. Quill v. Trans-World Airlines, Inc., 361 N.W.2d 438 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), 
review denied, (Minn. Apr. II, 1985). 
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emotional distress must physically manifest itself before recov-
ery will be allowed. 108 The court decided that the standards 
applicable to the intentional infliction of emotional distress 
cause 109 of action were inapplicable to a claim for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress: 
First, the supreme court did not state the independent tort 
of intentional infliction of emotional distress displaced all 
other torts in which damages for emotional distress had 
been allowed. Second, [recent cases] refer to physical 
symptoms without suggesting plaintiffs must meet the high 
threshold [for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
claims]. Minnesota law has long separated the two emo-
tional distress torts, not recognizing one until 90 years after 
adopting the other. We see little basis for borrowing an ele-
ment from one to add to the other, particularly when the 
zone of danger rule provides an indicia of genuineness the 
intentional tort requirements lack. I 10 
The court then considered whether the plaintiff met the 
physical injury or symptom requirement for negligent inflic-
tion claims. The court noted a lack of consistency on the issue 
and that some jurisdictions, such as California, have aban-
doned the requirement. II) Notwithstanding the presence of 
real physical injury or symptoms, the court concluded that re-
covery should be allowed: 
Although plaintiff's symptoms are less severe than those in 
Okrina and Purcell, we hold under the circumstances of this 
case that he has stated a prima facie case. The trial court 
upheld the jury's verdict finding that the "unique nature of 
the accident in this case [resolves] all doubts of the genuine-
ness of the claim."JJ2 
The court concluded that the unusually disturbing experi-
ence suffered by the plaintiff, along with the physical symp-
toms, which consist of anxiety in about half of the flights he 
takes, manifested by physical problems, including "adrenaline 
surges, sweaty hands, elevated pulse and blood pressure"))3 
108. Id. at 442. 
109. For a detailed discussion of intentional infliction of emolional distress, see 
infra Part III. 
110. (blill, 361 N.W.2d al 443. 
Ill. /d. 
112. Quill v. Trans-World Airlines, Inc., 361 N.W.2d 438 (Minn. Cl. App. 1985), 
review denied, (Minn. Apr. II, 1985). 
113. Id. al 441. 
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establish that his claim was real. 114 "The nature of that experi-
ence guarantees plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress 
during the descent and the emergency detour to Detroit."1l5 
Thus, the court justified its holding in Qp,ill, not because of 
the seriousness of the physical manifestations but because of 
the surrounding circumstances. To the court, the surrounding 
cirucmstances provided strong evidence that the claim was 
genuine, even though the plaintiff's physical manifestations 
did not appear to rise to the level of the physical harm as in 
Purcell, Okrina; or Leaon. Accordingly, the reference to Qp,ill in 
Leaon raises a question concerning the continuing legitimacy of 
the physical manifestation requirement. 
The more recent court of appeals decision of Silberstein v. 
Cordie raised the same issue. 116 In Silberstein, the family mem-
bers, who survived the murder of the family father while they 
were in an adjacent room from where the murder took place, 
all alleged varying degrees of emotional distress: 
After her husband's killing, Bonnie Silberstein experienced 
insomnia, loss of appetite, headaches and muscle tension 
for several months. Presently, she still is fearful about be-
ing alone and loud noises elevate her pulse and fill her with 
a "sense of dread." After the incident Bonnie's daughter 
required medical treatment for abdominal pain and consti-
pation, started biting her nails and developed highly sensi-
tive skin. Bonnie's son experienced blurred vision, 
dizziness and stomach problems. He also has become 
afraid of the dark. These symptoms plainly raise fact issues 
as to the manifestation of physical injury"" 
The Silberstein court cited Qp,ill to support its conclusion that 
the emotional distress claim could survive a motion for sum-
mary judgment. 118 Even where the symptoms appear to con-
stitute less than the "physical disability" initially required by 
Purcell and Okrina, the court concluded that the surrounding 
circumstances in both Qp,ill and Silberstein legitimized the plain-
tiffs' claims for emotional distress. In Silberstein, the family 
members heard five shots from a shotgun and the murderer, 
while carrying the shotgun, twice entered the bedroom where 
114. Id. at 443. 
115. Id. 
116. Silberstein v. Cordie, 474 N.W.2d 850, 852-53 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). 
117.ld.at857. 
118. Id. 
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the other family members were. 1 19 The facts not only confirm 
the argument that the family members were within the zone of 
danger but also that the emotional distress suffered was real. 
Taken together, Qpill and Silberstein may provide the bridge 
from the physical disability requirement to a rule allowing re-
covery for emotional distress absent physical injury, so long as 
the surrounding circumstances provide proof of the emotional 
distress. Failure to recognize the court's shift in focus makes 
these two decisions difficult to explain. At the very least, the 
cases raise questions concerning the value of the physical in-
jury requirement as the primary means of determining whether 
a claim for negligently inflicted emotional distress is 
legitimate. 
The California Supreme Court has also considered the con-
tinuing validity of its "nervous shock rule," the counterpart to 
Minnesota's physical manifestation rule. In Molien v. Kaiser 
Foundation Hospitals,120 the court stated that "if a plaintiff has 
suffered a shock to the nervous system or other physical harm 
which was proximately caused by negligent conduct of a de-
fendant, then such plaintiff is entitled to recover damages from 
such a defendant for any resulting physical harm and emo-
tional distress."121 Prior to Molien, California did not permit 
recovery of damages for emotional distress absent physical in-
jury if the emotional distress arose from negligence. 
California's nervous shock rule derived from Sloane v. South-
ern California Railway,122 an 1896 California Supreme Court 
case. The Molien court also noted that the rule apparently "has 
been immutable since its early origin, with virtually no regard 
for the factual contexts in which claims arose, or the alleged 
causes of emotional distress, or the prevailing state of medical 
knowledge." 1 23 
The Molien court had several problems with the physical in-
jury requirement. First, the court concluded that the require-
ment was both underinclusive and overinclusive in light of the 
purpose for the requirement. If screening false claims is the 
basis for the requirement, the rule is underinclusive because it 
119. Id. at 853. 
120. 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980). 
121. Id. at 818 (citations omitted). 
122. 44 P. 320 (Cal. 1896). 
123. Molirn, 616 P.2d at 818. 
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screens out claims that might otherwise be valid even without 
proof of physical injury. The rule is also overinclusive by per-
mitting claims where the injury is minor or trivial. 124 Second, 
the Molien court found that the nervous shock requirement 
"encourages extravagant pleading and distorted testi-
mony."125 And, third, the court could not discern a clear dis-
tinction between physical injury and emotional injury. 126 
In conclusion, the Molien court determined that the distinc-
tion between physical and psychological injury was a false 
Issue: 
The essential question is one of proof; whether the plaintiff 
has suffered a serious and compensable injury should not 
turn on this artificial and often arbitrary classification 
scheme. We thus agree with the view of the Rodrigues court: 
"In cases other than where proof of mental distress is of a 
medically significant nature, the general standards of proof 
required to support a claim of mental distress is some guar-
antee of genuineness in the circumstances of the case. This 
standard is not as difficult to apply as it may seem in the 
abstract. As Justice Traynor explained in this court's unani-
mous opinion in State Rubbish Collectors Ass 'n v. SiliznoJ!, ... 
the jurors are best situated to determine whether and to 
what extent the defendant's conduct caused emotional dis-
tress, by referring to their own experience. In addition, 
there will doubtless be circumstances in which the alleged 
emotional injury is susceptible of objective ascertainment 
by expert medical testimony .... To repeat: this is a matter 
of proof to be presented to the trier of fact. 127 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals has already indicated a 
weakening of the physical manifestation requirement in its 
Qpill and Silberstein opinions. Likewise, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court could readily justify abandoning the physical manifesta-
tion requirement based on the policy reasons that justified the 
departure in Molien. 
III. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
In 1983, in Hubbard v. United Press International, Inc., 128 the 
124. /d. at 820. 
125. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 616 P.2d 813,820 (Cal. 1980). 
126. /d. 
127. /d. at 821 (citing Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (Haw. 1970); State 
Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznolf, 240 P.2d 282 (Cal. 1952) (citations omitted). 
128. 330 N.W.2d 428, 438 (Minn. 1983). 
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Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the tort of intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress as a separate and independent 
tort. Prior to Hubbard, Minnesota allowed recovery of damages 
for emotional distress in situations where the plaintiff was not 
specifically threatened with physical injury but nonetheless suf-
fered emotional distress as a result of intentional action taken 
by the tortfeasor. This section provides a brief history of judi-
cial treatment of emotional distress claims prior to Hubbard, a 
more detailed explanation of the supreme court's adoption of 
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in that 
case, and an examination of some of the cases that have fol-
lowed Hubbard. These subsequent cases illustrate the appellate 
courts' punctilious adherence to its guidelines. Finally, this 
section will analyze the legitimacy of the rigid guidelines the 
courts have applied in thwarting intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress claims. 
A. Judicial Treatment of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
pre-Hubbard: A Short History 
Prior to Hubbard, the supreme court historically treated emo-
tional distress claims sympathetically. Yet, the court's willing-
ness to countenance emotional distress claims was balanced by 
carefully maintained limitations on the right to recover.129 In 
Lesch v. Great Northern Railway Co., 130 the plaintiff suffered emo-
tional distress as a result of the defendant's trespass and search 
of her personal property. The trespass and search were com-
mitted by two employees of the railroad, who were searching 
for railroad property.131 The plaintiff's husband was an em-
ployee of the railroad. The defendant's employees entered her 
yard and house, without permission. The plaintiff watched the 
two men as they walked from room to room and looked 
through a trunk and some boxes. The men did not make any 
threats or engage in any acts of violence, and the facts 
129. See Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 208 N.W. 814 (1926). TheJohnson 
court noted: 
[Tlhere is always a possibility of trumped. up claims if there may be a recov-
ery when no evidence of bodily injury can be discovered immediately. How-
ever, the matter is in the control of the trial courts and verdicts for plaintiffs 
for any substantial amounts, when based chiefly on proof of subjective 
symptoms, will not usually be allowed to stand. 
/d. at 207, 208 N.W. at 816. 
130. 97 Minn. 503, 106 N.W. 955 (1906). 
131. /d. at 505, 106 N.W. at 956. 
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presented indicate that the men had no intent to cause the 
plaintiff injury or to interfere in any way with her person. I !l2 
The court described the plaintiff's emotional state as 
follows: 
She was frightened by their acts, and immediately after they 
left she became sick, feverish, her head ached, she trembled, 
and had spells of vomiting. She was obliged to go to 
bed, and was confined to her bed most of the time for about 
two weeks, and was not well for a considerable time 
afterwards. I !I !I 
The defendant argued that the plaintiff was not entitled to re-
cover because there was no indication that the fright was the 
result of any legal wrong committed against her. 1!l4 
With no differentiation in principle between cases involving 
negligent and intentional conduct, the court held that, in order 
to recover for fright, the fright must be "the proximate result 
of a legal wrong against the plaintiff by the defendant." 1!l5 The 
court found that the plaintiff had established the necessary 
"legal wrong" in two ways: First, the defendant's employees 
interfered with the plaintiff's peaceful enjoyment of her home, 
in which she had an interest, even though her husband held 
legal title to the house. Second, the defendant's employees in-
terfered with the plaintiff's clothing. The court concluded that 
the evidence was sufficient to justify a finding that the employ-
ees had committed a tort against the plaintiff. 136 
The defendant also argued that the plaintiff's fright and ill-
ness were not proximately caused by the two employees. 137 
Again, the court disagreed: 
It is a matter of common knowledge that fright may, and 
often does, affect the nervous system to such an extent as to 
cause physical pain and serious bodily injury. The acts com-
plained of in this case were, if committed, an outrageous 
invasion of the sanctity of the home and the constitutional 
rights of the citizen, well calculated to frighten the wife and 
mother left alone in charge of her home. Whether she was 
frightened by such acts, and whether her illness, which im-
132. Id. 
133. 97 Minn. at 505-06, 106 N.W. at 956-57. 
134. Id. at 506, 106 N.W. at 957. 
135. Lesch v. Great N. Ry., 97 Minn. 503,106 N.W. 955 (1906). 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
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mediately followed, was the proximate result of such acts, 
were questions of fact for the jury. 138 
In 1926, in Johnson v. Sampson!39 the plaintiff, a fifteen-year-
old high school girl, alleged that the defendants came to her 
schoolhouse, took her into a separate room, and questioned 
her about her sexual activities. 140 The defendants accused her 
of having sexual intercourse with various men, which she truth-
fully denied. 141 Additionally, the defendants told the fifteen-
year-old that if she did not confess, she would be sent to re-
form school. She alleged that she suffered great mental 
anguish as a result of their actions and received a nervous 
shock that permanently impaired her health. 142 
Further, the plaintiff alleged that the facts made out a claim 
for assault, but the supreme court found the assault claim un-
tenable, since there was no threat of physical violence. How-
ever, the court concluded that the complaint stated a cause of 
action for damages involving the wrongful "invasion of plain-
tiff's legal right." 143 
Citing an earlier opinion, 144 the Sampson court stated that the 
law will not permit recovery for a wrong unless the act had an 
effect upon the plaintiff's person, property, or other legal in-
terest. 145 However, the Sampson court also recognized that. 
"wherever there is a wrongful act which infringes on a legal 
right, even though no physical harm was done or threatened, 
there may be a recovery, if mental suffering was a proximate 
result of the act."146 
The court in Sampson distinguished cases involving negligent 
infliction of emotional distress, where fright was the only con-
sequence, stating that "in such cases there is no element of 
wilful [sic] wrong."147 The court concluded that a willful 
wrong should lead to recovery: 
On the whole we see no good reason why a wrongful inva-
sion of a legal right, causing an injury to the body or mind 
13S. Id. at 506-07, 106 N.W. at 957. 
139. 167 Minn. 203, 20S N.W. S14 (1926). 
140. /d. at 204, 20S N.W. at SIS. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 207, 20S N.W. at S16. 
144. Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 311, 50 N.W. 23S, 239 (IS91). 
145. Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 205, 20S N.W. S14, SIS (1926). 
146. Id. (citation omitted). 
147. /d. at 206, 20S N.W. at SIS. 
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which reputable physicians recognize and can trace with 
reasonable certainty to the act as its true cause, should not 
give rise to a right of action against the wrongdoer, 
although there was no visible hurt at the time of the act 
complained of. Of course, there is always a possibility of 
trumped-up claims if there may be a recovery when no evi-
dence of bodily injury can be discovered immediately. 
However, the matter is in the control of the trial courts, and 
verdicts for plaintiffs for any substantial amounts, when 
based chiefly on proof of subjective symptoms, will not usu-
ally be allowed to stand. 148 
31 
Thus, the court concluded that the defendants violated a statu-
tory prohibition against accusations of fornication and invaded 
the plaintiff's "legal right to be secure in her reputation for 
virtue. . . ." 149 
Assuming the facts to be true, the plaintiff stated a claim not 
only for slander but also for the intentional and wrongful acts 
of the defendants that resulted in both physical injury and 
mental suffering. In addition, the surrounding circumstances 
made it likely that a person in the plaintiff's position would be 
shocked and would suffer some degree of emotional· harm and 
"would be likely to do harm to her nervous system."150 The 
court found the defendants intended to harm the plaintiff. 151 
In Schuh v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 152 the United 
States District Court for the District of Minnesota foreshad-
owed the Minnesota Supreme Court's opinion in Hubbard. 
Schuh involved a workplace harassment claim. The plaintiff al-
leged that his employer attempted to terminate him in order to 
cancel the plaintiff's insurance benefits before he became per-
manently disabled. The plaintiff alleged that he suffered se-
vere mental anguish and nervous disability as a result of the 
defendant's actions. 153 
The court found that the defendant did not intentionally 
cause the plaintiff's mental or physical breakdown nor did it 
intend to aggravate the plaintiff's condition. 154 Moreover, the 
148. [d. at 207, 208 N.W. at 816. 
149. [d. 
150. Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 208, 208 N.W. 814, 816 (1926). 
151. [d. 
152. 96 F. Supp. 400 (D. Minn. 1950). 
153. [d. at 401-02. 
154. [d. at 402. 
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court found no threatened physical injury to the plaintiff. 155 
The district court concluded that any aggravation of plaintiff's 
health by the defendant's conduct was necessarily a result of 
the plaintiff's worrying or concern, which in tum caused the 
plaintiff's breakdown. 156 
The district court recognized prevailing Minnesota law, 
which disallowed recovery for fright resulting in physical inju-
ries "in the absence of contemporaneous injury to the plaintiff, 
unless the fright is the proximate result of a legal wrong 
against the plaintiff by the defendant."157 In the absence of a 
clear interpretation of the "legal wrong" requirement by Min-
nesota courts, the district court interpreted the phrase to mean 
"the invasion of some legal right of another."158 
The Schuh court concluded that the plaintiff failed to estab-
lish a legal wrong. Absent a showing that the defendant inten-
tionally caused the plaintiff's mental breakdown or a showing 
that the defendant should have known his conduct created an 
unreasonable risk that distress would occur and result in illness 
or bodily harm,I59 the plaintiff could not recover. 
In 1979, in Haagenson v. National Farmers Union Property & Cas-
ualty Co., 160 the Minnesota Supreme Court presaged its opinion 
in Hubbard. Haagenson involved an insurer's failure to pay no-
fault benefits. The court appeared to intimate that the tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress would be an in-
dependent tort, given appropriate facts; however, the court 
stopped short of adopting intentional infliction of emotional 
distress as an independent tort. 161 
B. Hubbard v. United Press International: Minnesota's 
New Tort 
Finally, in 1983, the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the 
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress as a separate 
and independent tort. 162 In Hubbard v. United Press Interna-
155. /d. 
156. /d. 
157. Schuh v. Prudential Ins. Co., 96 F. Supp. 400, 403 (D. Minn. 1950) (citing 
Sanderson v. Northern P. Ry., 88 Minn. 162, 168, 92 N.W.2d 542, 544 (1902». 
158. [d. 
159. [d. 
160. 277 N.W.2d 649 (Minn. 1979). 
161. [d. at 652. 
162. [d. at 653. 
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tional,163 a discharged employee brought claims of retaliatory 
discharge, discrimination, and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. l64 Although the supreme court adopted the 
tort o( intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court de-
nied relief, holding that the evidence was insufficient to sustain 
the plaintiff's recovery under the newly adopted tort. 165 
1. Basis for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
As the basic formulation for the tort of intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, the court adopted section 46 of the Re-
statement (Second) of TortS. 166 Section 46 provides that 
"[o]ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally 
or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is 
subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily 
harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm."167 
Against the backdrop of its conservative common law ap-
proach to damages for emotional distress, the Hubbard court 
noted: 
Hubbard's argument that his independent claim for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress should be given full 
recognition raises the issue of whether contemporaneous 
physical injury or the allegation of malicious conduct suffi-
cient to constitute an underlying tort is critical to that claim 
or whether a claim of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress can stand alone as a separate cause of action. Our past 
reluctance to provide a direct remedy through the recogni-
tion of an independent tort reflects a policy consideration 
that an independent claim of mental anguish is speculative 
and so likely to lead to fictitious allegations that there is a 
considerable potential for abuse of the judicial process. 
Although our support of the policy of protecting the judicial 
process from trivial and speculative claims by restricting 
tort recoveries for mental distress is undiminished, we no 
longer feel that a rule requiring physical injury or an under-
lying tort is the most effective way to promote this policy. 
Rather, it is the view of this court that the problems inher-
ent in allowing recoveries for mental and emotional distur-
bances can be more clearly and adequately addressed if 
163. 330 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 1983). 
164. /d. at 430. 
165. Id. at 438-39. 
166. Id. at 439. 
167. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965). 
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intentional infliction of emotional distress is recognized as a 
separate and independent tort. Accordingly, we believe it is 
appropriate to recognize it in Minnesota at this time. 168 
2. Elements of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
The court established four elements that the plaintiff must 
prove in order to prevail in an intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress claim: "(1) the conduct must be extreme and 
outrageous; (2) the conduct must be intentional or reckless; (3) 
it must cause emotional distress; and (4) the distress must be 
severe. "169 
The Hubbard court defined "extreme and outrageous" to 
mean that the conduct has to be "so atrocious that it passes the 
boundaries of decency and is utterly intolerable to the civilized 
community."17o In addition, "severe emotional distress" re-
quires distress that "is so severe that no reasonable [person] 
could be expected to endure it." 1 71 
The court clearly expressed its intent to circumscribe the 
new tort's role in Minnesota tort law: 
168. Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, 330 N.W.2d 428, 438 (Minn. 1983). The 
court specifically noted that it did not adopt subsection (2) of section 46, which deals 
with the right of bystanders to recovery for the intentional or reckless infliction of 
emotional distress. /d. at 439 n.8. 
Id. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(2) (1965) provides: 
Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to 
liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress 
(a) to a member of such person's immediate family who is present at 
the time, whether or not such distress results in bodily harm, or 
(b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such distress re-
sults in bodily harm. 
Given the fact that the court requires some physical manifestation of the emo-
tional distress in all cases, it seems clear that a claimant would be entitled to recover 
for that physical manifestation, or bodily harm, under the Minnesota formulation, 
even if the language of subsection (2) is not specifically adopted. The theory of by-
stander recovery in subsection (2) should not conflict with Stadler v. Cross, 295 
N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1980), because the defendant's conduct must be intentional or 
reckless, rather than simply negligent, in order for the claimant to be entitled to 
recover. The right to recover for emotional distress under either subsection (I) or 
(2) does not in any event depend on whether the claimant is in the zone of danger. 
That concept is not a necessary condition to the imposition of liability under § 46. 
169. Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 438-39. 
170. Id. at 439 (quoting Haagenson v. National Farmers Union Property and Cas-
ualty Co., 277 N.W.2d 648, 652 n.3 (Minn. 1979) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965)). 
171. 330 N.W.2d at 439 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j 
(1965)). 
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In explaining both the extreme nature of the conduct neces-
sary to invoke this tort, and the necessary degree of severity 
of the consequent mental distress, the Restatement's com-
mentary emphasizes the limited scope of this cause of ac-
tion, and clearly reflects a strong policy to prevent fictitious 
and speculative claims. Because this policy has long been a 
central feature of Minnesota law on the availability of dam-
ages for mental distress, our adoption of the Restatement 
formulation as the standard for the independent tort of in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress does not signal an 
appreciable expansion in the scope of conduct actionable 
under this theory of recovery. The operation of this tort is 
sharply limited to cases involving particularly egregious 
facts. 172 
35 
3. Standards for Measuring Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress 
The facts in Hubbard provided a basis for the supreme 
court's denial of the claim for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. They also established a standard against which 
subsequent claims for emotional distress have been measured 
and routinely denied. The plaintiff's claim failed both because 
the defendant's conduct was not deemed extreme and outra-
geous and because the emotional distress was not severe 
enough. 173 In Hubbard, the plaintiff was disciplined by his em-
ployer, both verbally and in writing. In reviewing all the ac-
tions of the employer, the court concluded that as a matter of 
law, the employer's actions were neither extreme nor outra-
geous. Additionally, the court found that the employer's ac-
tions did not rise to the level of conduct that is "utterly 
intolerable in a civilized community." 174 Lacking proof of 
these two elements, the court also <;oncluded that the evidence 
of emotional distress was insufficient to sustain the plaintiff's 
claim: 
[T]he primary evidence of Hubbard's emotional distress 
was his own testimony that "because of" UPI's conduct he 
"had been depressed," that he had become "physically ill in 
terms of throwing up, and had stomach disorders," and that 
he had developed a skin rash and high blood pressure. De-
172. 330 N.W.2d at 439 (citation omitted). 
173. Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, 330 N.W.2d 428, 440 (Minn. 1983). 
174. [d. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 emt. d (1965». 
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spite this testimony about his problems, Hubbard never 
missed work, never filed a claim for workers' compensation, 
and never saw a doctor until June 1980, and went then only 
because he had the flu. Medical evidence as to Hubbard's 
injuries is conspicuously absent from the record. The ex-
tent of the "injury" proven by this record does not exceed 
that of any employee who experiences an employer's criti-
cism or reproof concerning job performance. Accordingly, 
the jury should not have been permitted to find that the dis-
tress was so severe that no reasonable person could be ex-
pected to endure it. 175 
The stringent standard adopted by the court for evaluating 
emotional distress claims, coupled with its careful scrutiny of 
the record and its admonition to trial courts to do the same,176 
provides trial and appellate courts with the mandate and au-
thority to rigidly limit emotional distress claims. Courts have 
followed this mandate and concluded with little difficulty that 
recovery should be denied as a matter of law in emotional dis-
tress cases, either because the defendant's conduct was not 
sufficiently extreme and outrageous 177 or because the plain-
175. Id. at 440 (citation omitted). 
176. Id. at 440 n.9. 
177. See, e.g., Leaon v. Washington County, 397 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1986). As 
previously discussed, the plaintiff in Leaon was humiliated at a stag party organized by 
four Washington County deputies. The supreme court disallowed the plaintiff's in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Citing the elements established in 
Hubbard, the court concluded: 
The trier of fact could find that the incident at the stag party was outrageous 
and intentional, and also, perhaps, that the incident caused at least Donald 
Leaon severe emotional distress. As a matter of law, however, we hold that 
events occurring after the party do not qualify as extreme and outrageous. 
Id. at 873. The court of appeals took the same position in Saltou v. Dependable Ins. 
Co., 394 N.W.2d 629 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). In Saltou, the insured, a veteran who 
suffered from a service-related nervous condition, and a mentally impaired compan-
ion with whom he was living and planned to marry, sued his insurer and its agents for 
wrongfully delaying payment of insurance benefits to him to cover damage to his 
mobile home. As a result of the delay in payment the plaintiffs claimed that they 
suffered both financial hardship and emotional injury. Mr. Saltou "lost weight, was 
put on valium, and had to go to [a crisis center] several times for emotional 
problems." The plaintiffs' suit alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
fraud, and unfair and discriminatory insurance practices. The plaintiffs requested 
both compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 631-32. 
The trial court granted summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claims. The court of 
appeals affirmed on two bases. First, the court held that "the failure to pay an insur-
ance claim in itself, no matter how malicious, does not constitute a tort; it constitutes 
a breach of an insurance contract." /d. at 633. Because the plaintiff is required to 
establish an independent tort, and the court concluded that the facts were insufficient 
to support the claims for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. As to 
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tiff's emotional distress was not severe enough!'s 
C. Illustrative Applications of the Hubbard Standards 
Much of the rigidity of the Minnesota law governing claims 
for the intentional infliction of emotional distress has devel-
oped in breach of contract and employment discharge cases, 
although that analysis has spilled over into other areas as well. 
This section examines illustrative cases arising in breach of 
contract, employment discharge, sexual abuse, and defamation 
cases. 
1. Breach of Contract and Employment Discharge Claims 
Minnesota's rigid approach to intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress claims has also developed parallels in breach of 
the emotional distress claim, the court said that "[a]lthough bad faith failure to pay 
insurance claims is not to be encouraged, and respondents took advantage of appel-
lants' vulnerable mental and economic condition, appellants must show more than 
malicious failure to pay an insurance claim in order to recover extra-contractual dam-
ages." Id. 
178. See, e.g., Born v. Medico Life Ins. Co., 428 N.W.2d 585 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1988), review denied, (Minn. Nov. 16, 1988). In Born, the wife of the deceased insured 
brought suit against the insurer for failure of the insurer, the insurer's agent, and a 
related company for failure to pay insurance benefits under the policy. Mr. Born 
misrepresented to the company his health condition at the time he applied for and 
obtained the policy coverage. When the company discovered that he had preexisting 
medical problems, the company rescinded the policy and provided a full premium 
refund, along with an explanation of the reasons for the rescission. The Borns did 
not cash the refund check. Two months later, they received a computer-generated 
letter stating that because the six-month waiting period for coverage of preexisting 
medical conditions had expired, Mr. Born was now covered for any preexisting medi-
cal conditions. The coverage letter was sent erroneously. Medico subsequently re-
fused to pay any claims, arguing that the policy was null and void. 
The insured's spouse, acting as personal representative of her husband's estate, 
brought suit against various defendants, alleging breach of contract and separate 
claims for negligence and waiver of forfeiture. She brought a claim on her own be-
half for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Following a jury trial, the jury, by answer to the special verdict form, found that 
Medico had waived its right to rescind the policy, that all parties were causally negli-
gent, that the plaintiff was entitled to contract damages and damages for her own 
pain and suffering, and that Mr. Born materially represented his health history. The 
trial court reduced Ms. Born's recovery by her percentage of fault, entered judgment 
against the defendants, and denied all post-trial motions. 
On appeal, the court of appeals held that the plaintiff did not establish her claim 
of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court held that there was no evi-
dence establishing that Medico's conduct was extreme and outrageous. Because of 
the material representation, the company had a right to rescind. In addition, the 
court held that the plaintiff did not "present medical testimony to substantiate any 
concrete physical manifestations of physical distress." Id. at 590. 
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contract and employment discharge cases. In cases involving 
breach of contract claims, the non-breaching party may allege 
various injuries flowing from the breach. Because the contract 
measure of damages is typically limited, the plaintiff will gener-
ally not include damages for mental suffering. 179 For exam-
ple, in cases involving breach of an insurance contract, 
damages are limited to "the loss that naturally and proximately 
flows from the breach."180 In Haagenson v. National Farmers 
Union Property & Casualty Co., the Minnesota Supreme Court 
held that "in the absence of specific statutory provision ... 
extra-contract damages are not recoverable for breach of con-
tract except in exceptional cases where the breach is accompa-
nied by an independent tort,"181 and, that "[a] malicious or 
bad-faith motive in breaching a contract does not convert a 
contract action into a tort action." 182 
Faced with the limitations on recoverable damages imposed 
by contract law, the non-breaching party will typically attempt 
to broaden the recoverable damages by alleging various 
torts-e.g., defamation, intentional interference with contrac-
tual relations, or the negligent and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress-along with claims for punitive damages. 183 
These tort claims are usually not successful and reflect the 
courts' unwillingness to expand the historically limited reme-
dies and damages available for breach of contract. 
In employment cases, the results are the same. Claims for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation are 
increasingly common in cases where the employer discharges 
an employee or otherwise takes action affecting the employee's 
job status. Whether the claim is for defamation 184 or the in ten-
179. See Beaulieu v. Great N. Ry., 103 Minn. 47,51,114 N.W. 353, 354 (1907). 
The Beaulieu court noted that mental anguish, while properly an element of damages 
in some tort actions, is "to be considered in actions for breach of contract in excep-
tional cases only." Id. 
180. Olson v. Rugloski, 277 N.W.2d 385, 387-88 (Minn. 1979) (finding that an 
insurer's liability for refusal to pay benefits includes liability for lost profits that are a 
direct and proximate result of the breach). 
181. 277 N.W.2d 648,652 (Minn. 1979). 
182. Id. 
183. See, e.g., Michaelson v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 474 N.W.2d 174 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1991). 
184. See Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 1990). In Wing, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court considered the relationship between common law tort 
claims and claims brought under the Minnesota Human Rights Act. The plaintiff had 
been harassed by a co-employee on numerous occasions. The store managers were 
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tional infliction of emotional distress, 185 the Minnesota 
Supreme Court has been reluctant to expand tort remedies to 
supplement the traditional contract remedies available to dis-
charged employees. One of the factors that appears to be at 
work in cases such as Hubbard, even if not explicitly stated, is 
the desire to avoid that expansion. Several appellate decisions 
illustrate this reluctance post-Hubbard. 186 
Cases involving contract breaches and employment dis-
charges present difficult issues, whether the tort claims are 
based on defamation or intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, because, as the courts have recognized, every employ-
ment discharge involves some emotional distress. 187 To avoid 
opening the floodgates and readily converting contract claims 
and employment discharges into tort claims, the court has re-
quired the plaintiff to prove distress over and above that ex-
perienced by employees who are discharged. A discharge in 
and of itself cannot be deemed extreme and outrageous. 
However, the rigid approach to claims for the intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress has transferred into other areas, 
even where the claims do not involve contract breaches or em-
aware of the problem but took no steps to correct it. In addition, the co-employee 
who had been harassing the plaintiff accused the plaintiff and other store employees 
of theft. At an open meeting called by management, the plaintiff and other accused 
employees were fired, after indirectly being accused of theft. The plaintiff recovered 
compensatory damages for defamation, but the court held that punitive damages 
could not be awarded because the employer had a subjective good faith belief that 
the theft charges were accurate. Id. at 381. 
185. Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 1983). 
186. See, e.g., Bradley v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 471 N.W.2d 670 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1991), review denied, (Minn. Aug. 2, 1991) (involving employment discharge; in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress disallowed, but plaintiff permitted to recover 
under other theories, including defamation and reprisal discrimination); Lund v. Chi-
cago & Northwestern Transp. Co., 467 N.W.2d 366 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), review 
denied, (Minn. Mar. 26, 1991) (pertaining to a manager's notes of a meeting with 
workers that reflected adversely on plaintiff); Lee v. Metropolitan Airport Comm'n, 
428 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (involving an employee's promotion which 
was delayed because the employee was charged with making harassing phone calls); 
Cafferty v. Garcia's of Scottsdale, Inc., 375 N.W.2d 850 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (em-
ployee discharge); Ecklund v. Vincent Brass & Aluminum Co., 351 N.W.2d 371 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (employee discharge). 
187. See Diamond Shamrock Ref. & Mktg. Co. v. Mendez, No. 0-1090, 1992 WL 
388116 (Tex. Dec. 31, 1992) (noting that while in some instances an employment 
termination may be accompanied by extreme and outrageous behavior sufficient to 
satisfy § 46, "there would be little left of the employment-at-will doctrine if an em-
ployer's public statement of the reason for termination was, so long as the employee 
disputed that reason, in and of itself some evidence" of the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress). 
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ployment discharges. Two recent cases illustrate the rigidity of 
the court's approach in other areas. 
2. Sexual Abuse Cases 
In Mrozka v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 188 the plain-
tiffs were an adult who was a child-victim of sexual abuse by a 
priest and the victim's parents. The defendants were the 
priest's Archdiocese and Diocese. The parents sued the Arch-
diocese alleging, inter alia, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. The victim sued the Archdiocese and Diocese for 
negligently allowing the priest to sexually abuse him when he 
was a minor. 189 
The jury awarded the victim compensatory and punitive 
damages. Yet the trial court remitted the punitive damage 
award, a decision which was affirmed by the court of appeals. 
In addition, the trial court dismissed the parents' claim for in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress, also affirmed by the 
court of appeals. 190 
Repeating its previous characterization of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress as a "disfavored tort,"191 the court 
of appeals acknowledged that the "emotional distress suffered 
by the parents was significant."192 Nonetheless, the court af-
firmed the trial court's dismissal of the claim because the proof 
was insufficient to overcome the "high threshold standard of 
proof required of a complainant before [ the issue] may be sub-
mitted to ajury."193 
3. Defamation 
In Strauss v. Thorne,194 the plaintiff sued the defendant-physi-
cian and his clinic for defamation because of statements made 
suggesting that the plaintiff was abusing her children. The 
plaintiff's suit was based on defamation and negligent and in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court 
188. 482 N.W.2d 806 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), reuiew denied, (Minn. May 24, 1992). 
189. Id. at 810. 
190. Id. at 814. 
191. /d. at 813-14 (citing Eklund v. Vincent Brass & Aluminum Co., 351 N.W.2d 
371, 379 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). 
192. Mrozka, 482 N.W.2d at 813. 
193. Mrozka v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 482 N.W.2d 806, 813 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992), reuiew denied, (Minn. May 24, 1992). 
194. 490 N.W.2d 908 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). 
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granted summary judgment on all claims. The court of ap-
peals reversed as to the defamation and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress claims l95 but sustained the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment on the plaintiff's claim for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. Noting the "high stan-
dard of proof needed for an intentional infliction of emotional 
distress claim,"196 the court of appeals agreed with the trial 
court that the defendant-physician's conduct "could not be 
considered extreme or outrageous by reasonable stan-
dards."197 The court of appeals also agreed that the plaintiff 
"failed to show manifestations of severe emotional distress" as 
a result of the defendants' actions. The court of appeals con-
cluded that "[g]eneral embarassment, nervousness and de-
pression are not in themselves a sufficient basis for a claim of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress." 198 
D. Are the Guidelines Appropriate? 
While contract breaches, employment discharges, or em-
ployer discipline of an employee invariably involve emotional 
distress claims, the courts' reluctance to readily allow recovery 
in those cases is understandable. Something over and above 
the action that an employer typically takes in discharging an 
employee has to be established. But establishing the range of 
normal-or at least "tolerable"-conduct may be accom-
plished more readily in employment situations than other 
claims. A baseline of conduct that has to be tolerated in con-
tract breach and employment discharge cases is easily discerni-
ble by courts. Too, a court's conclusion that an employer's 
conduct is not extreme and outrageous when it consists of 
195. Although there was a qualified privilege, the trial court held that there was 
insufficient evidence of malice to take the issue of abuse to the jury. The court of 
appeals reversed. 
The trial court's grant of summary judgment on the negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress claim was also reversed because it was supported by the defamation 
claim. However, the court's conclusion is questionable in light of Covey v. Detroit 
Lakes Printing Co., 490 N.W.2d 138, 144 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). Emotional distress 
need not be established by a separate negligence theory. Rather, in Covey, it was an 
offshoot of the defamation claim. Negligence becomes superfluous under the cir-
cumstances. [d. 
196. [d. at 913 (citing Lee v. Metropolitan Airport Comm'n, 428 N.W.2d 815, 823 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1988». 
197. /d. at 913. 
198. [d. at 913 (citing Eklund v. Vincent Brass & Aluminum, 351 N.W.2d 371, 379 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984), review denied, (Minn. Nov. I, 1984». 
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usual or standard practices in discharging an employee is more 
palatable than a bold assertion that conduct "could not be con-
sidered extreme or outrageous by reasonable standards."199 
The standard used to determine "severe emotional distress" 
element also presents problems. The Restatement's discus-
sion of the "severe emotional distress" requirement is as 
follows: 
The rule stated in this Section applies only where the 
emotional distress has in fact resulted, and where it is se-
vere. Emotional distress passes under various names, such 
as mental suffering, mental anguish, mental or nervous 
shock, or the like. It includes all highly unpleasant mental 
reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, 
embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and 
nausea. It is only where it is extreme that the liability arises. 
Complete emotional tranquillity is seldom attainable in this 
world, and some degree of transient and trivial emotional 
distress is a part of the price of living among people. The 
law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe 
that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it. The inten-
sity and the duration of the distress are factors to be consid-
ered in determining its severity. Severe distress must be 
proved; but in many cases the extreme and outrageous 
character of the defendant's conduct is in itself important 
evidence that the distress has existed .... 200 
In applying this standard, Minnesota cases seem to have mag-
nified the Restatement's standard that the distress be "so se-
vere that no reasonable person could be expected to endure 
it." While the Hubbard court adopted that standard as a base-
line, in application, the courts have required not only physical 
manifestations but also corroborating medical testimony.201 
Getting back to the basics, it seems clear that the supreme 
court did not intend to impose a physical injury requirement in 
cases involving intentional infliction of emotional distress 
claims. Hubbard imposed no such requirement. Hubbard was 
reaffirmed in Pikop v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co. 202 In 
Pikop, the court stated that "[i]n order to recover for the in ten-
199. This was the court's conclusion in Strauss v. Thorne, 490 N.W.2d 908, 913 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992). 
200. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt.j (1965) (emphasis added). 
201. See, e.g., Born v. Medico Life Ins. Co., 428 N.W.2d 585, 590 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1988), review denied, (Minn. Nov. 16, 1988). 
202. 390 N.W.2d 743 (Minn. 1986). 
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tional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff need not es-
tablish any physical injury, for the action seeks to compensate 
purely emotional injuries resulting from intentional acts."203 
In Johnson v. Morris,204 the plaintiff brought suit against two 
police officers, a deputy sheriff, and the cities and county that 
employed them. The plaintiff's claims stemmed from his 
arrest and restraint and an allegation that one of the officers 
shot at the plaintiff's truck tires after the plaintiff left the vehi-
cle. In addition to a claim for violation of his civil rights, the 
plaintiff alleged common law claims of false arrest, false im-
prisonment, assault, battery, and the intentional and negligent 
infliction of emotional distress.205 The trial court granted 
summary judgment for the defendants on all claims.206 The 
supreme court affirmed except for the assault claim.207 
The court noted that the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress claim required the plaintiff to establish that the de-
fendants' "conduct was extreme and outrageous, intentional 
or reckless, and that it caused severe emotional distress. "208 
However, the court held that the plaintiff failed to "demon-
strate the level of distress needed as an element of this type of 
cause of action. His 'signs and symptoms of depression' fall far 
short of being that type of distress which 'no reasonable man 
could be expected to endure ... .' "209 
In Hubbard, the court held that the degree of the plaintiff's 
emotional distress and supporting proof were insufficient to 
justify recovery. And, although the court said that "[m]edical 
evidence as to Hubbard's injuries is conspicuously absent from 
the record,"210 it did not impose a medical evidence requirement 
as an element of the prima facie case of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.211 
203. /d. at 754. 
204. 453 N.W.2d 31 (Minn. 1990). 
205. /d. at 32-33. 
206. /d. at 33. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. at 41. 
209. Id. (citing Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, 330 N.W.2d 428, 436 (Minn. 1983». 
210. Hubbard v. United Press InCI, 330 N.W.2d 428, 440 (Minn. 1983). 
211. The situation is analogous to the court's position on feasible alternatives in 
strict liability design defect cases in products liability litigation. In Kallio v. Ford 
Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92 (Minn. 1987), the court rejected the defendant's argu-
ment that proof of a feasible alternative should be an element of the plaintiff's case: 
Although normally evidence of a safer alternative design will be presented 
initially by the plaintiff, it is not necessarily required in all cases. Such evi-
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There are aberrations and some apparent confusion over the 
standards, however, as is to be expected in areas where the law 
is still being worked out. There are two good examples. 
The first is Quill v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. ,212 in which the 
court of appeals concluded that the supreme court did not in-
tend for the Hubbard standard to apply in negligent infliction 
cases, both because the supreme court did not indicate in Hub-
bard that the requirements of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress were to replace other torts in which damages for 
emotional distress are claimed, and second, because the 
supreme court in recent cases such as Langeland, referred to 
"physical symptoms" without suggesting that claimants have 
to meet Hubbard standards. The court of appeals in Quill 
viewed the zone of danger rule as providing "an indicia of gen-
uineness the intentional tort requirements lack."213 The court 
perceived the standards for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress to be harsher in requiring stronger proof of emotional 
injury than in negligence cases. 
In the second decision, M.H. v. Caritas Family Services,214 the 
supreme court has recently indicated that the court of appeals 
may have been incorrect in its view of the two torts. In Caritas, 
the supreme court held that public policy does not preclude an 
action for negligent misrepresentation against an adoption 
agency that undertook to provide information concerning the 
genetic background of a child's genetic parents and then negli-
gently failed to disclose information in a way that misled the 
adoptive parents. 
The court also held that the record did not support the claim 
of intentional misrepresentation and that, without the claim of 
intentional misrepresentation, the plaintiffs' claim for emo-
tional distress could not stand. In discussing the emotional 
distress claim the court said that 
Infliction of emotional distress, whether intentional or negligent, 
generally requires plaintifft to suffer a physical injury as evidence of 
dence is relevant to, and certainly may be an important factor in, the deter-
mination of whether the product was unreasonably defective. However, 
existence of a safer, practical alternative design is not an element of an al-
leged defective product. design prima facie case. 
[d. at 96-97 (citation omitted). 
212. 361 N.W.2d 438 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), review denied, (Minn. Apr. 18, 1985). 
213. Q!.lill, 361 N.W.2d at 443. 
214. 488 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1992). 
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their severe emotional distress. . . . Because plaintiffs have al-
leged no physical injury resulting from their alleged emo-
tional distress, their motion to amend was properly denied 
unless they alleged a "direct invasion" of their rights by 
"willful, wanton, or malicious conduct. ... " There is no evi-
dence of such a direct invasion of plaintiffs' rights, or of 
willful, wanton, or malicious conduct on the part of Caritas. 
Plaintiffs have provided no evidence that Caritas deliber-
ately misled them, much less wantonly did SO.215 
45 
The court's statement in Cantas is inconsistent with the court's 
prior rejection of the physical injury requirement in Hubbard 
and Pikop. The court may simply have blurred the lines be-
tween physical injury arising out of emotional distress and 
physical manifestation of emotional distress, or the court's 
statement may be a reflection of the fact that the physical in-
jury requirement from the negligent infliction of emotional 
distress cases is in reality the same as the physical manifesta-
tion requirement in the intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress cases. Either way, the court's opinion is understandable. 
The lines may have also been blurred in the negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress cases. While the court has framed 
the requirement in negligent infliction cases as a "physical in-
jury" requirement, the court has also discussed the required 
proof of physical injury as a "physical manifestation" require-
ment. For example, in Leaon v. Washington County,216 the court 
upheld a trial court's dismissal of a claim for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress because the plaintiff "failed to show 
physical manifestations of emotional distress."217 
If the common ground for both negligent and intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress cases is a "physical manifesta-
tion" requirement, the decisions become easier to understand. 
Whether the enhanced requirements are justifiable is a dif-
ferent question. The Restatement's theory is that the sur-
rounding circumstances are the best indicator of whether the 
claimant has sustained severe emotional distress. In addition, 
the same concerns that other courts have expressed over the 
retention of the physical injury requirement in negligent inflic-
tion cases apply at least in part to claims for the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. The questionable link between 
215. [d. at 290 (emphasis added). 
216. 397 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1986). 
217. [d. at 875. 
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physical manifestations and emotional distress, and the poten-
tial unreliability of medical testimony linking emotional trauma 
to a certain occurrence should be concerns in the intentional 
infliction cases as well. 
The greater concern is that the guidelines the supreme court 
has established for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
may have become more than guidelines, however, in applica-
tion by the lower courts and court of appeals. These guide-
lines appear to have become "shackles."218 At the very least, it 
is arguable that the severe emotional distress requirement 
should not be viewed as an insurmountable requirement prov-
able only by physical manifestations confirmed by medical evi-
dence. Instead, scrutiny of the record to determine whether 
under all the circumstances the plaintiff has a legitimate claim 
for severe emotional distress seems more consistent with the 
initial guidelines established by the supreme court. 
In Hubbard the court specifically noted that it did not adopt 
subsection (2) of section 46, which deals with the right of by-
standers to recover for the intentional or reckless infliction of 
emotional distress.219 
218. See John E. Simonett, The Use of the Term "Result-Oriented" to Characteriu Appel-
late Decisions, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 187 (1984). Justice Simonett states in his 
article that "[I]egal rules are a powerful restraint on result-oriented decisions, but 
there must still be enough elasticity in the rules to allow for the law's evolution. The 
rules are guides, not shackles." Id. at 203. 
219. Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, 330 N.W.2d 428, 438 (Minn. 1983). In 
Dornfeld v. Oberg, 491 N.W.2d 297 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), the court was presented 
with a novel issue involving the right of a plaintiff to recover for emotional injury that 
was produced by fear for the safety of another. In Dornfeld, the plaintiff was waiting in 
the car while her husband of three days changed a tire on their car. A driver of 
another vehicle crossed the northbound lanes of the highway and hit the Dornfeld 
vehicle, striking Mr. Dornfeld and dragging him 200 to 230 feet down the highway, 
killing him. Ms. Dornfeld was thrown around the inside of the vehicle but suffered 
no physical injury. The driver of the other vehicle was aITested. A blood test re-
vealed a blood alcohol content of .224. Id. at 299. 
Following the accident, Ms. Dornfeld was unable to concentrate, had serious mi-
graine headaches, had an ulcer attack, and had a flare-up of ileitis. . . . [S]he was 
unable to sleep, had memory problems and had nightmares, including flashbacks of 
the crash. She sought counseling for her problems, but her condition did not im-
prove. Dornfeld has been diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder 
as a result of the accident. Id. 
She brought suit against the driver of the other car and her underinsured motor-
ist carrier, alleging both negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
The jury returned a verdict finding that the plaintiff "was in the zone of physical 
danger at the time of the accident, that she reasonably feared for her own safety at 
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Subsection (2) of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 
provides: 
the time, but that she did not suffer severe emotional distress as a result of her fear 
for her own safety." Id. 
The jury awarded the plaintiff $230,600 in compensatory damages for the dis-
tress she suffered because she was present at the accident scene and witnessed her 
husband's death. Concluding that the plaintiff had a valid claim for the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, the trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff on 
the verdict against the driver of the other car. The court determined later that the 
plaintiff's policy with American Family provided her $100,000 in underinsured mo-
torist insurance coverage. That determination was also affirmed by the court of ap-
peals. Id. at 302. 
The defendants argued on appeal that permitting recovery by Dornfeld would 
require the court of appeals to create a new cause of action. The court of appeals 
disagreed, concluding that recovery "is warranted by application of an established 
body of Minnesota tort law." Id. at 300. 
Id .. 
The court then said that the Minnesota Supreme Court in Hubbard 
merely corrected the physical injury requirement prior Minnesota cases had 
imposed on persons seeking to recover for emotional distress. Hubbard did 
not limit the development of the law up to that time. Minnesota has long 
allowed recovery to persons within the zone of danger. Recovery was de-
nied in Stadler solely because the plaintiffs were not within the lOne of dan-
ger, thus implying that if the plaintiffs had been within the lOne of danger, 
recovery would have been permitted. 
In a footnote, the court noted that the New York Court of Appeals had adopted 
the lOne of danger rule but permitted a claim for emotional harm under similar cir-
cumstances. [d. at 300 n.1 (citing Bovsun v. Sanperi, 461 N.E.2d 843 (N.Y. 1984». 
Recovery was predicated on the theory of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress. The potential impediment to allowing recovery under a negligence theory is 
the jury's finding that the plaintiff "reasonably feared for her own safety at the time" 
of the accident but that she did not suffer severe emotional distress as a result of her 
fear for her own safety. For a discussion of the impact of negligence theory on recov-
ery under such circumstances, see supra notes 119-126 and accompanying text. 
Dornfeld thus appears to straddle two lines of cases, one permitting recovery for 
the plaintiff where the plaintiff's emotional distress is fear for her own safety if she is 
in the lOne of danger and the other denying recovery to a bystander who fears for the 
safety of another. In Dornfeld, the plaintiff's claim does not fit squarely within either 
line of cases. The plaintiff is in the zone of danger, but her emotional distress is the 
product of fear for the safety of another. And, although the plaintiff suffers emo-
tional distress as the result of fear for the safety of another, she is not a bystander so 
as to fall within the line of cases prohibiting recovery solely on that basis. 
The court of appeals avoided the dilemma by applying § 46 of the RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS. The critical issue is whether the common law should permit 
recovery in cases where the plaintiff is in the lOne of physical danger created by a 
defendant's reckless misconduct, suffers emotional distress severe enough to consti-
tute bodily harm within the meaning of the Restatement and physical harm within the 
meaning of the Minnesota zone of danger cases, but where the emotional distress 
and physical consequences are the product of fear for the safety of her husband. 
Given the jury's findings, the result could be supported either by the application of 
general negligence principles or by § 46 of the Restatement. 
In general, § 46 provides an alternative theory of recovery in cases where the 
plaintiff suffers emotional distress but, because of inability to satisfy the lOne of dan-
HeinOnline -- 19 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 48 1993
48 WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 19 
Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor 
is subject to liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes 
severe emotional distress 
(a) to a member of such person's immediate family 
who is present at the time, whether or not such distress 
results in bodily harm, or 
(b) to any other person who is present at the time, if 
such distress results in bodily harm.22o 
Given that the court requires a showing of some physical 
manifestation of the emotional distress in all cases, it seems 
clear that a claimant would be entitled to recover for that phys-
ical manifestation or for bodily harm, under the Minnesota for-
mulation, even if the language of paragraph (2) is not 
specifically adopted. Less clear is what position the court 
might take on the issue of whether a bystander should be enti-
tled to recover under paragraph (2), without being in the zone 
of danger. 
Section 46 applies to a person who by extreme and outra-
geous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emo-
tional distress to another and for any bodily harm that results. 
Where the defendant's conduct is directed at a third person, 
the defendant is subject to liability if the defendant "intention-
ally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress . . . to a 
member of such person's immediate family who is present at 
the time, whether or not such distress results in bodily harm, 
or ... to any other person who is present at the time, if such 
distress results in bodily harm." 
Comment i addresses the state of mind issue: 
The rule stated in this Section applies where the actor 
desires to inflict severe emotional distress, and also where 
he knows that such distress is certain, or substantially cer-
ger requirement, would ordinarily be denied recovery under a negligence theory. In 
cases where the defendant's conduct is reckless, the plaintiff may meet the require-
ments of § 46. In particular, if the defendant is driving while intoxicated, the theory 
may justify bystander recovery. In this situation, Minn. Stat. § 169.21 provides fur-
ther support for the claim of recklessness. This statute requires submission of the 
punitive damages issue to the jury in cases where evidence shows that an "accident 
was caused by a driver (1) with a blood alcohol concentration of .10 or more, (2) who 
was under the influence of a controlled substance, or (3) who was under the influence 
of alcohol and refused to take a test required under section 169.123(2) .... " MINN. 
STAT. § 169.21 (1992). Proof of "deliberate disregard" of the rights or safety of an 
injured person would surely satisfy the standard for reckless behavior. 
220. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(2) (1965). 
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tain, to result from his conduct. It applies also where he 
acts recklessly, as that term is defined in § 500, in deliberate 
disregard of a high degree of probability that the emotional 
distress will follow.221 
49 
Liability follows if the defendant acts intending to cause the 
severe emotional distress and where he acts "in deliberate dis-
regard of a high degree of probability that the emotional dis-
tress will follow." 
Comment I explains the bystander recovery provision: 
Where the extreme and outrageous conduct is directed at a 
third person, as where, for example, a husband is murdered 
in the presence of his wife, the actor may know that it is 
substantially certain, or at least highly probable, that it will 
cause severe emotional distress to the plaintiff. In such 
cases the rule of this section applies. The cases thus far de-
cided, however, have limited such liability to plaintiffs who 
were present at the time, as distinguished from those who 
discover later what has occurred. The limitation may be 
justified by the practical necessity of drawing the line some-
where, since the number of persons who may suffer emo-
tional distress at the news of an assassination of the 
President is virtually unlimited, and the distress of a woman 
who is informed of her husband's murder ten years after-
ward may lack the guarantee of genuineness which her pres-
ence on the spot would afford. The Caveat is intended, 
however, to leave open the possibility of situations in which 
presence at the time may not be required. 
Furthermore, the decided cases in which recovery has 
been allowed have been those in which the plaintiffs have 
been near relatives, or at least close associates, of the per-
son attacked. The language of the cases is not, however, 
limited to such plaintiffs, and there appears to be no essen-
tial reason why a stranger who is asked for match on the 
street should not recover when the man who asks for it is 
shot down before his eyes, at least where his emotional dis-
tress results in bodily harm.222 
The right to recover for emotional distress under either par-
agraph in section 46 does not in any event depend on whether 
the claimant is in the zone of physical danger. Although the 
theory of bystander recovery in the second paragraph should 
not conflict with Stadler, because the defendant's conduct must 
221. [d. § 46 ernt. i. 
222. /d. § 46 ernt. 1. 
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be more culpable-intentional or reckless-rather than simply 
negligent in order for the claimant to be entitled to recover. If 
the difference in culpabity is insufficient to justify a different 
treatment for bystanders who seek to recover for intentionally 
or recklessly inflicted emotional distress, the second paragraph 
will not present an advantage, unless the physical manifesta-
tion requirement is dropped. 
Where the claimant seeks to establish that she is entitled to 
recover based not on the defendant's intent to cause severe 
emotional distress but rather the defendant's recklessness, the 
Restatement standards governing reckless misconduct have to 
be consulted, particularly in light of the potential paradox cre-
ated by the comparison of section 46 to the sections that gov-
ern reckless misconduct. 
Section 500 of the Restatement defines reckless disregard of 
the safety of another: 
The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of 
another if he does an act or intentionally fails to do an act 
which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having 
reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man 
to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable 
risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is 
substantially greater than that which is necessary to make 
his conduct negligent.223 
Comment d covers cases involving claimants who are in the 
zone of danger: 
If the actor's conduct is such as to involve a high degree of 
risk that serious harm will result from it to anyone who is 
within range of its effect, the fact that he knows or has rea-
son to know that others are within such range is conclusive 
of the recklessness of his conduct toward them. It is not, 
however, necessary that the actor know that there is anyone 
within the area made dangerous by his conduct. It is 
enough that he knows that there is strong probability that 
others may rightfully come within such zone.224 
Section 501 of the Restatement states that, subject to two 
exceptions covering causation225 and defenses,226 "the rules 
which determine the actor's liability to another for reckless dis-
223. [d. § 500. 
224. [d. § 500 cmt. d. 
225. [d. § 501(2). 
226. [d. § 503. 
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regard of the other's safety are the same as those which deter-
mine his liability for negligent misconduct. "227 The 
Restatement, therefore, funnels claims based on reckless mis-
conduct through the usual negligence rules to determine when 
a defendant is subject to liability. The right to recover, there-
fore, still hinges on the acceptance of the Hambrook approach 
in negligence cases. 
The contradiction seems to exist because section 500, re-
quires that the plaintiff be within the zone of danger, whereas 
section 46 does not. However, the provisions may be reconcil-
able because sections 500 and 501 involve cases where there is 
a threat of physical injury to the plaintiff, making it logical to 
apply negligence rules as the baseline to determine whether 
recovery should be allowed. Conversely, where the defend-
ant's conduct threatens the plaintiff with serious emotional 
harm, it is arguable that section 46 should control, and that the 
plaintiff should be entitled to recover, as a bystander, without 
being in the zone of danger, upon establishing that the defend-
ant acted recklessly in causing the plaintiff severe emotional 
distress. 
IV. STATUTORY ACTIONS, TORT CLAIMS, 
AND WRONGFUL DEATH 
Given the rigidity of the Hubbard guidelines, it is important 
to determine whether alternative theories of recovery may per-
mit a claimant's recovery for emotional injury without meeting 
the Hubbard guidelines. 
A. Statutory Actions 
In cases where no underlying tort justifies an award of dam-
ages for emotional suffering, the Hubbard standards may still be 
circumvented where the legislature has created a statutory 
227. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 501 (1965). The two exceptions are in 
subsection (2) of § 501 and § 503 of the Restatement. Subsection (2) reads as 
follows: 
(2) The fact that the actor's misconduct is in reckless disregard of another's 
safety rather than merely negligent is a matter to be taken into account in 
determining whether a jury may reasonably find that the actor's conduct 
bears a sufficient causal relation to another's harm to make the actor liable 
therefor. 
Id. Section 503 governs defenses, taking the position that ordinary contributory neg-
ligence is not a defense to a claim of reckless misconduct, although the plaintiff's 
own reckless misconduct would be a defense. 
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cause of action. The statutory action may either provide di-
rectly for the award of damages for mental suffering,228 or may 
provide a statutory action for civil damages without mention-
ing damages for emotional suffering. In the latter case, the 
statutory action itself may be deemed the same as an underly-
ing tort in order to justify damages for emotional suffering 
without meeting the Hubbard standards. 
1. Minnesota Human Rights Act Claims 
In cases involving discrimination or harassment in employ-
ment, an aggrieved employee may have different paths to pur-
sue. The employee may proceed with an administrative claim 
of discrimination or harassment against the employer under 
the Minnesota Human Rights Act,229 or the employee may 
bring a civil claim against the employer. 
The Minnesota Human Rights Act applies to discrimination 
or harassment based on sex, including "unwelcome sexual ad-
vances, requests for sexual favors, sexually motivated physical 
contact or other verbal or physical conduct or communication 
of a sexual nature when ... that conduct or communication has 
the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an indi-
vidual's employment ... or creating an intimidating, hostile, or 
offensive employment . . . environment. "230 The Act also ap-
plies to discrimination based on "race, color, creed, religion, 
national origin, ... marital status, status with regard to public 
assistance, membership or activity in a local commission, disa-
bility, or age."231 The Act makes it a violation for an employer 
"to discriminate against a person with respect to hiring, ten-
ure, compensation, terms, upgrading, conditions, facilities, or 
privileges of employment. "232 
Damages available under the Minnesota Human Rights Act 
include compensatory and punitive damages. The court may 
also award damages for "mental anguish or suffering."233 
In State v. Mower County Social Services,234 the court found that 
the rigid standards established by the Hubbard court in in ten-
228. Human Rights Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 363.01-.15 (1990). 
229. /d. 
230. [d. § 363.01(41)(3). 
231. [d. § 363.03(1)(2). 
232. /d. § 363.03(1)(2)(c). 
233. [d. § 363.071(2). 
234. 434 N.W.2d 494 (Minn. Cl. App. 1989). 
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tional infliction of emotional distress claims do not have to be 
met in order for damages for "mental anguish or suffering" to 
be awarded under the Human Rights Act.235 The lesser stan-
dard for the award of damages for mental anguish or suffering 
will be justified even absent proof of the elements of the tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.236 
The facts in Mower County provide a good illustration of the 
differences in standards of recovery. The plaintiff alleged that 
her employer passed her over for permanent employment as a 
clerk-typist because of her pregnancy and marital status.237 
The administrative law judge concluded that the employer had 
discriminated against the plaintiff and awarded her damages 
for backpay and medical expenses that would have been cov-
ered by insurance had she been hired. In addition, the judge 
awarded the plaintiff $2,000 in damages for mental anguish 
and suffering and $2,000 in punitive damages.238 
The administrative law judge justified the damage award by 
finding that the plaintiff had become "frustrated, angry and de-
pressed" after the county rejected her application.239 The 
judge also noted that the county's rejection aggravated her re-
lationship with her husband and others, and her "experience 
in having to ask her former co-workers for welfare was 
degrading.' '240 
The county argued that the evidence was insufficient to jus-
tify a damage award for emotional suffering under Hubbard, 
which requires severe emotional distress caused by egregious 
circumstances. The court of appeals held that the Hubbard 
standard was inapplicable: 
In Hubbard, the supreme court concluded the plaintiff could 
not recover damages for mental distress because the plain-
tiff's distress was not sufficiently severe or caused by "par-
ticularly egregious facts." Hubbard is distinguishable on two 
grounds. First, the plaintiff in Hubbard asserted an in-
dependent tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress in addition to his employment discrimination 
235. 434 N.W.2d at 499-500. 
236. Id. 
237. [d. at 496. 
238. Id. at 497. 
239. State v. Mower County Social Serv., 434 N.W.2d 494, 497 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1989). 
240. Mower County, 434 N.W.2d at 497. 
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claims. The claim for mental anguish in Hoy's case is based 
on statutory law rather than common law. Second, at the 
time of the Hubbard suit, the Human Rights Act did not al-
low damages for mental anguish or suffering.241 
The court of appeals found substantial evidence in the record 
to support the findings of the administrative law judge's award 
of damages for mental anguish. The court emphasized the fact 
that the claimant was awarded $2,000 in punitive damages 
under circumstances where the defendant's acts showed a 
"willful indifference to the rights or safety of others. "242 Based 
upon that finding, the court of appeals concluded that "the 
county's conduct was sufficiently severe to also cause Hoy com-
pensable mental anguish and suffering."243 
The court of appeals, affirming the judgment, emphasized 
the egregious nature of the defendant's actions and deem-
phasized the severity of the emotional distress. A comparison 
of the analysis in Hubbard and Mower County illustrates that a 
gap exists between fact patterns that may justify a common law 
claim for emotional distress, on the one hand, and those that 
justify a claim under the Human Rights Act, on the other. 
2. Polygraph Examinations 
Asl<.ing a person to take a polygraph test may give rise to a 
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In 
Kamrath v. Suburban National Bank,244 the plaintiff's employer 
asked her to take a polygraph test, a request that violated state 
law. The polygraph statute in effect at the time read: "No em-
ployer or agent thereof shall directly or indirectly solicit or re-
quire a polygraph, voice stress analysis, or any test purporting 
to test the honesty of any employee or prospective em-
ployee."245 The statute also contained a specific provision au-
thorizing civil remedies: 
In addition to the remedies otherwise provided by law, any 
person injured by a violation of this section may bring a civil 
action to recover any and all damages recoverable at law, 
241. Id. at 499-500 (citation omitted). 
242. Id. at 500. 
243. Id. 
244. 363 N.W.2d 108 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). 
245. MINN. STAT. § 181.75(1) (1984). The statute was amended in 1986lO remove 
gender specific references. That amendment did not change the substance of the 
law. 
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together with costs and disbursements, including costs of 
investigation and reasonable attorney's fees, and receive 
other equitable relief as determined by the court.246 
55 
The facts in Kamrath arose out of a police investigation of 
certain missing deposits from a local McDonald's restaurant. 
The local police asked several McDonald's employees to take a 
polygraph test,247 and, in addition, two of the bank's tellers 
who were not suspects in the case. The plaintiff was one of the 
tellers. The plaintiff testified that a bank vice-president asked 
her to take the test, telling her that she could refuse.248 
Several days after she took the test, she began experiencing 
problems. She began to have nightmares. Family members 
testified that "she became more withdrawn, gained weight, and 
was very tired. "249 The plaintiff sought neither counseling nor 
medical treatment for her problems.25o 
At her attorney's request, the plaintiff was later examined by 
a psychiatrist. Although initially skeptical that a polygraph test 
could have such a strong impact, the psychiatrist determined 
that the plaintiff suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder. 
A professor of psychiatry and psychology testified that some-
one with the plaintiff's strongly religious background, with a 
strong religious code that emphasized honesty, could react to 
the test more severely than an average person.251 To her, the 
test was an accusation of dishonesty.252 
The examining psychiatrist concluded that the plaintiff had a 
"15% permanent emotional disability based on (1) her emo-
tional inability to work at any job involving handling money, 
and (2) her increased dependence on her husband, resulting 
from her inability to express her feelings and develop close re-
lationships with others."253 The jury found that the bank 
asked the plaintiff to take the test and that the bank's conduct 
directly resulted in harm to her. The jury awarded her 
246. Id. § 181.75(4). 
247. Kamrath, 363 N.W.2d at 110. 
248. /d. 
249. Kamrath v. Suburban Nat'} Bank, 363 N.W.2d 108, 110 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1985). 
250. Id. 
251. Id. 
252. Id. 
253. Id. 
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$60,000 in damages.254 
The trial court in the case refused to instruct the jury on the 
theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress or to grant 
a new trial on the basis that the jury was not required to find 
that the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
existed before awarding damages.255 The bank argued that, 
absent a physical injury, the plaintiff had to meet the Hubbard 
requirements in order to recover for emotional distress. The 
court of appeals rejected the argument: 
Traditionally a plaintiff is not entitled to damages for 
mental distress without a physical injury unless there is 
some conduct constituting a direct invasion of her rights, 
such as slander, libel, malicious prosecution, willful, wanton 
or malicious misconduct. Hubbard recognizes the independ-
ent tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
adopts elements intended to ensure that a tort actually oc-
curred and that injury was intentionally inflicted.256 
Because of the underlying statutory cause of action, the court 
of appeals concluded that "harm of the type Kamrath suffered, 
based in emotional distress, flows naturally from the act consti-
tuting the underlying tort. "257 
3. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
In Venes v. Professional Service Bureau, Inc. ,258 the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff who was subjected to 
debt collection practices that violated the Federal Debt Collec-
tion Practices Act was entitled to recover damages for emo-
tional distress.259 The plaintiffs in the case received harassing 
phone calls from a collection agency that was attempting to 
collect certain debts for the Mayo Clinic.260 The jury awarded 
the plaintiff $6,000 for emotional distress. On appeal, the 
court considered whether the evidence was sufficient to justify 
a finding that the defendant's conduct was extreme and 
outrageous.261 
254. Kamrath v. Suburban Nat'l Bank, 363 N.W.2d 108, 110 (Minn. Cl. App. 
1985). 
255. Kamrath, 363 N.W.2d at Ill. 
256. Id. (citations omitted). 
257. Id. at 112. 
258. 353 N.W.2d 671 (Minn. Cl. App. 1984). 
259. Id. at 675. 
260. Id. at 673. 
261. /d. 
HeinOnline -- 19 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 57 1993
1993] EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 57 
The trial court instructed the jury that, to recover for emo-
tional distress under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the 
plaintiff had to establish the elements of an intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress claim.262 The court of appeals con-
cluded that the jury could have found that the collection 
agency's conduct "exceeded its legal rights and recklessly or 
intentionally inflicted severe emotional distress" upon the 
plaintiff.263 The court did not discuss the severity of the plain-
tiff's emotional distress. The plaintiff testified that the 
agency's conduct had threatened, insulted, and irritated him, 
and that "the stress of the calls and the litigation aggravated 
his preexisting medical problems, such as migraines, ulcers 
and his spastic bowel syndrome."264 Whether such testimony 
would support an award under the specific standards of Hub-
bard is questionable. 
The more interesting, and more difficult, question raised by 
Venes is whether a plaintiff who asserts a violation of the Fed-
eral Debt Collection Practices Act, or any other statute that es-
tablishes a specific remedy for its violation, should be entitled 
to recover damages for the emotional injury sustained by the 
violation, even if the Hubbard standard for the intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress is not met. 
Venes and Kamrath appear to conflict on this question when 
the statute does not directly provide for damages. The Human 
Rights Act is not part of the conflict, because that Act specifi-
cally provides for the award of damages for mental anguish 
and suffering. Venes indicates that, if damages for emotional 
distress are to be recoverable, the Hubbard standards must be 
met,265 while Kamrath indicates to the contrary. 
The Federal Debt Collection Practices Act provides a civil 
remedy for "any actual damage sustained by such person as a 
result of such failure."266 The polygraph statute from Kamrath 
also provides a specific civil remedy for "any and all damages 
recoverable at law."267 Consistency should dictate a uniform 
approach to the question of statutory causes of action that do 
262. Id. at 674. 
263. Venes v. Professional Servo Bureau, 353 N.W.2d 671, 675 (Minn. Cl. App. 
1984). 
264. [d. at 673. 
265. [d. at 674. 
266. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(l) (1988). 
267. MINN. STAT. § 181.75(4) (1990). 
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not specifically provide for the award of damages for mental 
anguish and suffering. 
In Carrigan v. Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc.,268 the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia 
noted that although the term "actual damage" in the Federal 
Debt Collection Practices Act is not defined, plaintiff's right to 
damages "should tum on whether or not he would be entitled 
to collect damages, were this a cause of action for the inten-
tional infliction of mental distress."269 Although the court 
held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover minimal damages 
for emotional suffering,270 it is not clear why the court tied the 
right to recover to state law requirements for the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. 
In Bingham v. Collection Bureau, Inc. ,271 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of North Dakota held that a plaintiff 
was entitled to recover damages for emotional suffering for 
harassing phone calls. The plaintiff's husband was awarded 
damages for loss of consortium.272 The facts of the case sug-
gested that the emotional distress was minimal and likely 
would not meet the requirements for an independent claim for 
the intentional infliction of emotional distress.273 The actual 
damages in the case were relatively small.274 A psychologist 
testified: 
[The plaintiff] was no longer childlike in her happiness, that 
she had lost her interest in housework, that she was not 
paranoid, but distrustful of telephones. That her sleep was 
disturbed, she had nightmares, headaches, a sensitive stom-
ach, and was prone to cry. He accepted her statements at 
face value and despite her obvious physical problems, con-
cluded without further investigation that all her physical 
problems were psychosomatic, and caused by the wrongful 
acts of the telephone collectors. . . . Peggy herself testified 
that after the first call she "cried and cried and cried and 
cried. "275 
The trial court concluded that "she suffered no permanent ill 
268. 502 F. Supp. 468 (N.D. Ga. 1980). 
269. [d. at 470. 
270. [d. at 471. 
271. 505 F. Supp. 864 (D.N.D. 1981). 
272. [d. at 875. 
273. [d. at 866-70. 
274. [d. at 875. 
275. [d. 
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effects from the experience of the calls, and that most of her 
crying was habitual or cosmetic. However, she is of the group 
to be protected and she has suffered injury."276 The trial court 
awarded her damages of $1,000, and her husband $100.277 
If Venes is based upon the conclusion that the Federal Debt 
Collections Practices Act includes only the damages that are 
recoverable under an independent tort claim under state law, 
then Venes appears to be consistent with Carrigan. However, 
there is no clear reason why the damage must be so limited. 
An alternative explanation of Venes is that the case was submit-
ted to determine whether the elements of intentional infliction 
of emotional distress were satisfied. The issue of whether 
those elements had to be satisfied was not before the court in 
Carrigan. 
As the court intimated in Bingham, the damages, whatever 
they are, are compensable where evidence supports the claim. 
The legislative judgment that a debt collector who engages in 
the prohibited conduct should be responsible for the harm 
caused should be a sufficient basis to justify an award of dam-
ages for emotional distress, regardless of whether the in-
dependent state standards for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress are satisfied. If so, then Kamrath would state 
the prevailing rule that recovery for an emotional injury is al-
lowed for an express statutory violation. 
B. Interference with Family Relationships 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has long emphasized the im-
portance of family relationships.278 The court has recognized 
two types of family rights: "(1) those of the members of the 
276. Bingham v. Collection Bureau, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 864, 875 (D.N.D. 1981). 
277. Id. 
278. See, e.g., Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 402,37 N.W.2d 543, 545 (1949). 
In Miller, the court stated: 
As a practical proposition, the family is in large measure a self-governing 
unit so far as concerns its internal affairs. From a social point of view it is 
also a most important one. It is the foundation of civil society, sanctioned as 
such by both civil and ecclesiastical authority. It provides not only shelter, 
food, comfort, family life, happiness, and security for its members, but also 
instruction in, and example of, virtue, morality, and character. ... Human 
society could not endure without it. Among the rights of the members of a 
family as against the world are those of having the family maintained intact 
without interference by outsiders. . .. In the Heck case, it was held that not 
only "every member" of the family has a "right" to protect family rights 
against outside interference (there criminal conversation with the wife), but 
that the state also has an interest in the protection thereof. This right is 
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family among themselves, and (2) those of the members of the 
family as against the world. "279 Further, the court has at-
tempted to protect these relationships by permitting tort 
claims for alienation of affections, criminal conversation, or en-
ticing a parent to abandon a child, and by barring tort claims 
by family members against each other via the application of 
intrafamily tort immunities.280 
The demise of the intrafamily tort immunities and the 
supreme court's adoption of the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress have created new opportunities for lawsuits 
by family members against each other. However, the statutory 
abolition of alienation of affections actions281 and the supreme 
court's refusal to recognize a new tort of interference with cus-
todial relationships may act as a brake on expanded tort recov-
eries against persons who interfere with family relationships. 
Marriage dissolution is an additional factor to consider. The 
law is not clear on the issue of whether an emotional distress 
action is barred in a dissolution action and whether the judg-
ment in a dissolution action extinguishes any claim for emo-
tional distress. 
Several types of claims may be brought by family members 
for emotional distress. The abolition of family tort immuni-
ties282 leaves open the possibility of intrafamily tort claims for 
emotional distress by family members against each other. Sub-
ject to statutory and common law restrictions, family members 
may also have tort claims for emotional distress against third 
persons who interfere with family relationships. Interference 
with family relationships may occur in a variety of situations, 
including cases where family relationships are upset by outsid-
protected also under the constitution of the United States against outside 
interference even by government. 
!d. (citations omitted). 
279. !d. at 401,37 N.W.2d at 544. 
280. Id. at 402, 37 N.W.2d at 545. 
281. MINN. STAT. § 553.01 (1990). 
282. See Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980) (abolishing parental 
immunity, overriding the exceptions retained by the court for acts involving the exer-
cise of reasonable authority and acts involving the exercise of ordinary parental dis-
cretion concerning food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other 
care previously retained in Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 
(1968)); Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969) (abolishing in-
terspousal tort immunity); Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966) 
(abolishing immunity of unemancipated child from action by parent for negligent 
driving of motor vehicle). 
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ers who disrupt or destroy those relationships and in post-dis-
solution cases where a noncustodial parent interferes with the 
custodial parent's relationship with the child.283 Although the 
abolition of family tort immunities has created the possibility 
of increased tort liability, mitigating factors against expansion 
exist, including the legislature's judgment that actions for 
alienation of affections and criminal conversation are inimical 
to the best interests of the state and should be abolished.284 
Claims for emotional distress run headlong into these limita-
tions. The issue may be whether the presence of an underlying 
claim or the legislative or judicial prohibition of such a claim 
should preclude assertion of a claim for the intentional or neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress to circumvent the limita-
tions on claims for abuse of family relationships. 
1. Intrafamily Claims for Emotional Distress 
In Beaudette v. Frana,285 the Minnesota Supreme Court abol-
ished interspousal tort immunity but not without reservations: 
There is an intimate sharing of contact within the marriage 
relationship, both intentional and unintentional, that is 
uniquely unlike the exposure among strangers. The risks of 
intentional contact in marriage are such that one spouse 
should not recover damages from the other without sub-
stantial evidence that the injurious contact was plainly ex-
cessive or a gross abuse of normal privilege. The risks of 
negligent conduct are likewise so usual that it would be an 
unusual case in which the trial court would not instruct the 
jury as to the injured spouse's peculiar assumption of 
risk.286 
While abolishing the interspousal tort immunity, the court ad-
vises caution in approaching the issue of tort recovery by sug-
gesting a threshold of "plainly excessive" action or action that 
is a "gross abuse of normal privilege."287 
Instead of focusing on the "privilege" that one spouse may 
have to engage in tortious conduct with respect to the other 
spouse, a court should focus on whether the tort claims of as-
283. See Sharon McDonnell Dobbs, Tort Recovery for Intentional Inteiference with Custo-
dial Rights in Minnesota, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1159 (1991). 
284. MINN. STAT. § 553.01 (1990). 
285. 285 Minn. 366,173 N.W.2d 416 (1969). 
286. Id. at 372-73, 173 N.W.2d at 420. 
287. Id. 
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sault and battery have been established. In cases involving ex-
treme and outrageous conduct by one spouse against the 
other, the question should be whether the facts establish the 
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Assault and 
battery are predicated on threatened contact or unconsented 
contact while intentional infliction of emotional distress fo-
cuses on extreme and outrageous conduct. Those require-
ments are arguably sufficient guarantees against abuse of the 
marital relationship and should suffice to sort out meritless 
claims. Where the claim is for the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, the requirements of extreme and outra-
geous conduct should preclude action for the usual distress in-
herent in family relationships. The requirements should also 
offset and highlight action that causes an impermissible level of 
emotional distress to a family member.288 
Actions for dissolution of a marriage may complicate the pic-
ture when one spouse sues another for torts committed during 
the marital relationship. No Minnesota cases have resolved the 
issue of whether tort claims may be brought in conjunction 
with a dissolution action or whether the tort claims may be 
barred by the dissolution. Although Minnesota eliminated 
fault as a requirement for dissolution in 1974,289 fault may still 
provide the basis for a tort claim by one spouse against an-
other. 290 A tort claim for the intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress could be joined with the dissolution action,291 or 
it could be litigated separately, subject to the court's admoni-
tion in Beaudette v. Frana. 292 
A court has several options when confronted with a claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress in conjunction with 
a dissolution action. The court might conclude (1) that the dis-
288. For example, the outrageous conduct element of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress barred claims brought by spouses who sought recovery for emo-
tional distress allegedly brought on by the other spouse's adultery. See Strauss v. 
Cilek, 418 N.W.2d 378 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987); Ruprecht v. Ruprecht, 599 A.2d 604 
(NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991). 
289. See Act of March 14, 1974, ch. 107, § 4, 1974 Minn. Laws 157 (amending 
MINN. STAT. § 518.06 (1971». 
290. See ROBERT E. OLIPHANT, MINNESOTA FAMILY LAw PRIMER § 47.5 (3d ed. 
1991) (suggesting that a claim for domestic assault may be combined with the divorce 
action "with a reasonable expectation of recovery-even if it is 'his' portion of the 
homestead.") . 
291. MINN. R. CIV. P. 18. 
292. 285 Minn. 366, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969). 
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solution action extinguishes the claim for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress if the claim is based on the same ground 
that justified the dissolution;293 (2) that the claim for inten-
tional infliction is incompatible with the dissolution action be-
cause it resurrects fault-based dissolution and creates the same 
problems that the legislature intended to avoid by removing 
fault as a basis for dissolution;294 (3) that the claimant is barred 
because he or she has failed to meet the standards for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress;295 or (4) allow the claim 
even when unaccompanied by physical injury.296 
In Stuart v. Stuart,297 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that 
a judgment in a marital dissolution did not bar a subsequent 
suit for intentional torts, including the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, committed during the marriage. The court 
concluded that the legal principles underlying "res judicata, 
equitable estoppel and waiver" did not bar recovery.298 
The court also concluded that joinder of the tort claims in 
the dissolution action was not required: 
If an abused spouse cannot commence a tort action subse-
quent to a divorce, the spouse will be forced to elect be-
tween three equally unacceptable alternatives: (1) 
Commence a tort action during the marriage and possibly 
endure additional abuse; (2) join a tort claim in a divorce 
action and waive the right to ajury trial on the tort claim; or 
293. See, e.g., Pickering v. Pickering, 434 N.W.2d 758, 761 (S.D. 1989). The Picker-
ing court stated that "[w]e believe the tort of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress should be unavailable as a matter of public policy when it is predicated on 
conduct which leads to the dissolution of a marriage." [d. The court also barred the 
plaintiff's claims for fraud and deceit. [d. 
294. See Doe v. Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595, 598 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987). 
295. See Strauss v. Cilek, 418 N.W.2d 378, 380 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987). See also 
Whittington v. Whittington, 766 S.W.2d 73, (Ky. Ct. Ap. 1989); Ruprecht v. Ru-
precht, 599 A.2d 604, 607-08 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991); Wiener v. Wiener, 444 
N.Y.S.2d 130 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); Davis v. Bostick, 580 P.2d 544, 546 (Or. 1978). 
296. See, e.g., Ruprecht, 599 A.2d at 606. The Ruprecht court noted: 
This court is not satisfied that a flood of litigation with fraudulent claims or 
the resurrecting of fault, or the possibility of confusing the issues of custody, 
support, and equitable distribution should deny one spouse from suing the 
other in a divorce proceeding for emotional distress without physical injury. 
There is no valid policy interest nor logical reason to allow one spouse to 
sue the other for physical injury but not for emotional distress absent physi-
cal injury. Certainly mental and emotional distress is just as "real" as physi-
cal pain. 
Id. See also Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 811 P.2d 
575 (N.M. 1991). 
297. 421 N.W.2d 505 (Wis. 1988). 
298. [d. at 507. 
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(3) commence an action to terminate the marriage, forego 
the tort claim, and surrender the right to recover damages 
arising from spousal abuse. To enforce such an election 
would require an abused spouse to surrender both the con-
stitutional right to a jury trial and valuable property rights 
to preserve his or her well-being. This the law will not do. 
Although joinder is permissible, the administration of 
justice is better served by keeping tort and divorce actions 
separate .... Divorce actions will become unduly compli-
cated if tort claims must be litigated in the same action. A 
divorce action is equitable in nature and involves a trial to 
the court. On the other hand, a trial of a tort claim is one at 
law and may involve, as in this case, a request for ajury trial. 
Resolution of tort claims may necessarily involve numerous 
witnesses and other parties such as joint tortfeasors and in-
surance carriers whose interests are at stake. Consequently, 
requiring joinder of tort claims in a divorce action could un-
duly lengthen the period of time before a spouse could ob-
tain a divorce and result in such adverse consequences as 
delayed child custody and support determinations. The 
legislature did not intend such a result in enacting the di-
vorce code.299 
2. Interference with the Custodial Relationship 
In 1978, the legislature abolished actions for alienation of 
affections, criminal conversation, seduction and breach of 
promise to marry: 
Actions based upon alleged alienation of affections, crimi-
nal conversation, seduction and breach of contract to 
marry, have been subject to grave abuses, have caused in-
timidation and harassment, to innocent persons and have 
resulted in the perpetration of frauds. It is declared as the 
public policy of the state that the best interests of the peo-
ple of the state will be served by the abolition of these 
causes of action.30o 
In Bock v. Lindquist,30I the Minnesota Supreme Court de-
clined to recognize a parent's claim against a third party for 
alienation of a child's affections. While not banned by the stat-
utory prohibition on alienation of affections actions because 
299. /d. at 508, (quoting Stuart v. Stuart, 410 N.W.2d 632, 637-38 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1987) (citations omitted)). 
300. MINN. STAT. § 553.01 (1990). 
301. 278 N.W.2d 326 (Minn. 1979). 
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the statute had not yet become effective, the court found the 
legislative history strong enough to justify a ban on the action 
as contrary to public policy.302 
However, the court in Bock limited its holding: 
Nothing in this opinion diminishes other remedies for inter-
ference with familial relationships, remedies which make ac-
tions for alienation of affections unnecessary as well as 
undesirable. Violations of judicial orders establishing cus-
todial or visitational rights in one parent may in appropriate 
situations be corrected by habeas corpus or, more com-
monly, by citation for contempt of court. Actions for defa-
mation, enticement, or contributing to the delinquency of a 
minor remain available against a stranger who meretri-
ciously intrudes into a family relationship.303 
In Larson v. Dunn,304 the supreme court considered the ques-
tion of whether it should recognize a new tort for the inten-
tional interference with parental custodial or visitation rights. 
The plaintiff brought suit against his ex-spouse as well as mem-
bers of her family who allegedly aided her in hiding their 
daughter.305 The plaintiff, who had permanent legal custody, 
searched for his daughter for seven years.306 After his daugh-
ter was returned to him, he commenced suit against his ex-
spouse and her relatives for interfering with his custodial 
rights.307 The court of appeals recognized the tort of interfer-
ence with custodial rights: 
One who, with knowledge that the parent does not consent, 
abducts or otherwise compels or induces a minor child to 
leave a parent legally entitled to its custody or not to return 
to the parent after it has been left him, is subject to liability 
to the parent.308 
The court of appeals concluded that the aggrieved parent 
would be entitled to recover for the following damages: (1) 
damages for lost society of the child; (2) damages for emo-
tional distress; (3) damages for the lost services of the child; (4) 
expenses incurred in reasonable efforts to locate the child; and 
302. !d. at 328. 
303. [d. at 328. 
304. 460 N.W.2d 39 (Minn. 1990). 
305. [d. at 41. 
306. [d. at 42. 
307. [d. 
308. Larson v. Dunn, 449 N.W.2d 751, 756 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (quoting RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700 (1977». 
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(5) reasonable expenses incurred in treatment of the child.so9 
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed.slO The court's rea-
sons for rejecting the tort centered around the common theme 
of protecting the best interests of the child, who is already sub-
ject to significant emotional injury as a result of the marital 
breakup leading to the custody problems. The court recog-
nized the potential for the abuse of the tort as a new weapon in 
family disputes.sll Creating a new tort would create a new 
wrong, placing innocent children in the middle of lawsuits be-
tween parents.S12 "For the good of our children, the law 
should seek to promote such harmony as is possible in families 
fractured by the dissolution process. At a minimum, the law 
should not provide a means of escalating intrafamily 
warfare. "s 1 S 
In addition, the law already provides redress for a custodial 
parent whose rights are infringed.s14 The parental kidnapping 
statute provides for an award of costs incurred by the custodial 
parent in recovering the child.s15 However, this restitution 
does not compensate for emotional injury associated with dep-
rivation of a child's presence. 
The court also noted that "emotional distress could possibly 
be recovered in egregious cases through the independent tort 
ofIntentional Infliction of Emotional Distress."316 In addition, 
309. 449 N.W.2d at 756-58. 
310. /d. at 758. 
311. Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39, 46 (Minn. 1990). The Larson court noted its 
prior opinion in Bock v. Lindquist, 278 N.W.2d 326 (Minn. 1979). The Bock case 
involved a claim for alienation of a child's affections after the legislature had abol-
ished alienation of affections actions. The Bock court rejected the claim: 
The circumstances under which the right has here been asserted demon-
strate the potential for grave abuses, in which a child becomes the object of 
intrafamily controversy and, indeed, a pawn in disputes over monetary mat-
ters. In the more usual case of marriage dissolution resulting in deterio-
rated relationships, a cause of action by one parent against another for 
alienation of a child's affections would exacerbate the unhappy relationships 
and become a strategic tool for advantageous use of one family member 
over another. 
Id. at 327-28. 
312. Larson, 460 N.W.2d at 46. 
313. /d. 
314. /d. The court referred to MINN. STAT. § 61IA.04(1) (1990), which states that, 
before a sentencing or dispositional hearing, the court may consider a crime victim's 
request for restitution. 
315. See MINN. STAT. § 609.26(4) (1990). 
316. Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39, 46 (Minn. 1990) (citing Hubbard v. United 
Press Int'l, 330 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 1983)). 
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the supreme court held that "Minnesota already recognizes the 
action for lost services of the child."!l17 However, the compen-
sation for loss of a child's services will not include the broader 
element of loss of consortium, which is limited to cases where 
one spouse claims damages because of injury to the other.!l18 
The Larson court also concluded that the tort would not de-
ter parental abduction and that it would result in a prolifera-
tion oflitigation.!l19 In conclusion, the court held: "Expanding 
the adversarial process to include this new tort is contrary to 
the best interests of children and will only intensify intrafamily 
conflict growing out of marriage dissolution without deterring 
parental abduction. "!l20 
While Larson qualifies Bock by foreclosing a specific action for 
interference with custodial rights, the court nonetheless left 
open the possibility of an action for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.!l21 The tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress is both narrower and broader than the tort of 
intentional interference with custodial rights. Intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress is broader because the tort may 
be utilized by noncustodial parents. The tort is narrower be-
cause it requires proof of severe emotional distress; the tort of 
interference with custodial rights does not. 
The difference in the interests protected by the two torts 
also means that the damages are different. Under the custodial 
claim, the plaintiff-parent is entitled to recover damages for 
317. Larson, 460 N.W.2d at 46. The Larson court referred to Eichten v. Central 
Minn. Power Ass'n, 224 Minn. 180, 195,28 N.W.2d 862, 871 (1947), which recog-
nized a parent's right to recover for loss of a child's services, even though the evi-
dence of the loss is "indirect, hypothetical, and to some extent speculative." 
318. See Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736, 738 (Minn. 1982). 
319. 460 N.W.2d at 47. 
320. [d. 
321. Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39, 46 (Minn 1990). The supreme court's opin-
ion is somewhat equivocal. After indicating that the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress would be available in "egregious" cases, the court also stated that 
while "the conduct in this case is egregious, and done in defiance of a court order, 
the proper remedy for such violation of the court's integrity lies in contempt and 
other such sanctions; not in providing the other party with compensation." [d. The 
court then referred to Bock v. Lindquist, 278 N.W.2d 326 (Minn. 1979), noting that 
the Bock court denied the parent recovery for alienation of a child's affections, par-
tially because the action was prospectively abolished by statute and the availability of 
other remedies made the action unnecessary. Larson, 460 N.W.2d at 46. However, 
given the court's initial recognition of the availability of the action for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress as a potential remedy in an appropriate case, it ap-
pears that the court did not intend to completely foreclose the action. 
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the emotional distress flowing from the abduction, loss of the 
child's society or services, and reasonable expenses the custo-
dial parent may have incurred in regaining custody of the 
child.322 Under the emotional distress claim, the plaintiff 
would be entitled to recover for emotional distress, but the 
plaintiff must demonstrate severe distress. The tort of inten-
tional interference with custodial rights does not require such 
proof. While the tort of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress provides an alternative, the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress is a less effective remedy than the tort of 
intentional interference with custodial rights. 
Use of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
in cases involving custodial rights will create problems based 
on the degree of outrageousness necessary to establish a prima 
facie case. Cases allowing the tort for interference with custo-
dial rights bear out the problem.323 
Additional problems arise where the claim for intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress is based not on the interference 
with custodial rights but on visitation rights. Most of the juris-
dictions that have rejected claims for alienation of affections or 
the intentional infliction of emotional distress for interference 
with custodial rights have done so where the interference was 
with visitation rights, short of complete removal of the child.324 
These jurisdictions have reasoned, similar to the Larson court, 
that this use of the tort fosters neither the child's best interests 
nor the best interests of the judicial system.325 That reasoning 
may be sufficient to establish a bright line between cases in-
volving interference with custodial rights and those involving 
visitation rights. 
While Larson resolves the issue of intentional interference 
with custodial rights, the problem of recovery for actions previ-
ously covered by alienation of affections actions remains. Two 
potential claims for emotional distress may be brought in cases 
previously covered by the tort of alienation of affections. The 
322. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700 cmt. g (1977). 
323. See Kunz v. Deitch, 660 F. Supp. 679, 684-85 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (deprivation of 
custody for seven months sufficient to establish prima facie case for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress); Sheltra v. Smith, 392 A.2d 431, 433 (Vt. 1978) (depriva-
tion of custody for one month held to state a prima facie case). 
324. See Hershey v. Hershey, 467 N.W.2d 484, 488 (S.D. 1991). 
325. See, e.g., Dymek v. Nyquist, 469 N.E.2d 659, 667 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); Bhama 
v. Bhama, 425 N.W.2d 733, 737 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988). 
HeinOnline -- 19 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 69 1993
1993] EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 69 
plaintiff may sue either for negligent or intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.326 The claim for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress is not exactly parallel to the alienation of 
affections action, an action that courts have clearly held to be 
an intentional tort. Additionally, assertion of a claim for negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress would likely run afoul of 
the zone of danger and physical disability requirements. The 
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress presents 
different problems. 
It is unclear what position the Minnesota Supreme Court will 
take with respect to the right to pursue a claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress in cases previously covered by 
alienation of affections. The court's choice depends on 
whether it will consider the legislative policy behind abolishing 
the alienation of affections action strong enough to preclude 
an emotional distress claim. 
In an action for alienation of affections, an aggrieved spouse 
was required to prove the following: 
(1) That one spouse had the other spouse's affections until 
defendant interfered; (2) that one lost the other's affections; 
(3) that defendant took an active and intentional part in 
causing the plaintiff-spouse's loss of affections; and (4) that 
defendant acted willfully and intentionally.327 
The "defendant's wrongful and intentional conduct" must 
have been "the controlling cause of the estrangement between 
plaintiff and his wife."328 
The tort of alienation of affections is an intentional tort 
based on the tort of enticement.329 There is a strong element 
of loss of consortium underlying the claim.330 A showing of 
negligence is insufficient to establish the tort.331 "The acts 
which lead to the loss of affection must be wrongful and inten-
tional, calculated to entice the affections of one spouse away 
326. Bhama. 425 N.W.2d at 734. A third potential claim would be loss of consor-
tium. but. because the supreme court has recognized that the essence of the aliena-
tion of affections claim is loss of consortium. it does not seem likely that the· 
consortium claim could circumvent the statutory limitation of alienation of affections 
actions. See generally Larson v. Dunn. 449 N.W.2d 751 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). 
327. Pedersen v.Jirsa. 267 Minn. 48. 52.125 N.W.2d 38. 41-42 (1963). 
328. [d. at 52. 125 N.W.2d at 42. 
329. [d. at 54. 125 N.W.2d at 43. 
330. See Thill v. Modern Erecting Co .• 284 Minn. 508. 511. 170 N.W.2d 865. 868 
(1969). 
331. [d. 
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from the other. "332 
Notwithstanding the statutory abolition of the tort of aliena-
tion of affections, the possibility remains that the torts of inten-
tional or negligent infliction of emotional distress could be 
asserted. There are two potential approaches to the problem 
with respect to the intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
One is to bar the action for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress where the claim is asserted against the defendant for 
the same conduct that would have given rise to a claim for 
alienation of affections prior to the statutory abolition of the 
action. The other is to take the position the supreme court 
took in Larson: the separate and independent tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress is sufficiently distinct from the 
disfavored action, such that it is actionable even though the 
claim for alienation of affections is no longer assertable. 
In Wilson v. Still,333 the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held 
that the statutory abolition of alienation of affections actions 
precluded recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress: 
Regardless of what the plaintiff calls her cause of action, she 
has sued the defendant for wilfully taking away her hus-
band. It could have been called "alienation of affections"; it 
could have been called "seduction"; it could have been 
called "criminal conversation." But all civil law suits under 
those theories have now been prohibited. Can she proceed 
on the theory of "outrage"? The law ... tells us she can 
not. The plaintiff is asking us to allow a jury to find certain 
conduct so outrageous as to be "regarded as atrocious and 
utterly intolerable in a civilized community", when the leg-
islative body freely elected from the same community has 
expressly and deliberately, within our own generation, re-
moved the acts complained of from those bearing civil lia-
bility in tort. We cannot accommodate the plaintiff without 
doing grave insult to our legislators and those who elected 
them. This we will not do. 334 
The court's opinion in Wilson is typical of the rationale used by 
courts denying the claim for emotional distress.335 
Other courts have concluded that the judicial or statutory 
332. Pedersen v.Jirsa, 267 Minn. 48, 54-55,125 N.W.2d 38, 43 (1963). 
333. 819 P.2d 714 (Okla. 1991). 
334. Id. at 716. 
335. See Christopher J. Whitesell, Note, Loss o/Consortium and Intentional Infliction 0/ 
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abolition of alienation of affections claims does not preclude 
assertion of claims for the intentional infliction of emotional 
Emotional Distress: Alternative Theories to Alienation of Affections, 67 IOWA L. REV. 859, 876 
(1982). 
In Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 533 A.2d 1358 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987), cert. 
denied, 537 A.2d 272 (Md. 1988), the court stated: 
[A]bolition of the actions for alienation of affections and criminal conversa-
tion does not preclude a person from maintaining a traditional breach of 
contract action or a recognized tort action merely because the breach arose 
from an improper liaison with the plaintiff's spouse or because one effect of 
the alleged breach or tortious conduct was a disruption or breakup of his or 
her marriage. . . . What is precluded ... is the refitting of the abolished 
actions into other forms. One cannot sue to recover for injuries arising 
from "defilement of the marriage bed" or from an interference with the 
marriage by simply casting the defendant's conduct as a breach of contract, 
or negligence, or some other intentional tort. 
Id. at 1360. 
In Homer v. Long, 599 A.2d 1193, 1201 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992), the court 
held that a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress could not be asserted 
in face of a legislative and judicial abrogation oftort actions for criminal conversation 
and alienation of affections. In Homer, the plaintiff sued under various theories, in-
cluding the intentional infliction of emotional distress, because a doctor had engaged 
in sexual relations with the plaintiff's spouse while his spouse was a patient. [d. at 
1194. The court denied the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. 
The court recognized that the doctor's conduct may have been extreme and outra-
geous and that the conduct violated clear standards established by the medical com-
munity, but the court noted that "the essence of the requirement is that the conduct 
must not simply be extreme and outrageous from the perspective of society at large, 
or from the perspective of someone else, but must be so as to the plaintiff. Outra-
geous conduct directed at A does not necessarily give B a cause of action." [d. at 
1198. The court treated the claim as a bystander recovery case, denying the claim 
because it has typically been limited to those plaintiffs who are present at the time of 
the tortious action and who are known to be present by the defendant. /d. at 1199. 
The court's rationale in barring recovery because the conduct is not intentional 
as to the husband would, of course, bar virtually any emotional distress claim arising 
out of interference with a family relationship, unless done in the presence of the 
person making the claim, an unlikely probability. Knowledge to a substantial cer-
tainty that another will sustain injury should be sufficient. 
While the court noted that some courts have relaxed the requirement in compel-
ling cases, the court saw no reason not to apply the general rule: 
The emotional and economic trauma likely to arise from the seduction of 
one's spouse is not limited to the case where the seducer is the spouse's 
therapist. The conduct may be just as outrageous and the harm may be just 
as great where the seducer is a neighbor, a good friend, a relative, an em-
ployee or business associate of the plaintiff, or indeed anyone in whom the 
plaintiff has imposed trust or for whom he or she has special regard. To 
relax or abrogate the presence requirement in such cases would greatly ex-
pand the scope of the tort as framed and adopted by the Court of Appeals, 
which we are unwilling to do. 
[d. at 1199-1200; see also Koestler v. Pollard, 471 N.W.2d 7 (Wis. 1991) (barring a 
claim by a mother's husband against the biological father for concealing paternity 
through application of a statute abolishing actions for criminal conversation, public 
policy, and public policy underlying the statute). 
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distress.ss6 The arguments for allowing the claim for emo-
tional distress are stronger when one considers the differences 
between the torts. Both the damages and elements of the 
claims are different. SS7 
Perhaps the most telling argument is based on the pattern of 
analysis followed by the supreme court in Larson.sss Ifthe pub-
lic policy that precludes the separate tort of interference with 
custodial rights does not preclude assertion of the claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, the legislative pol-
icy precluding alienation of affection actions should not dis-
place the later developed tort of intentional infliction of 
336. See, e.g., Spiess v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1020 (Or. Ct. App.), ajJ'd en bane by an 
equally divided court, 765 P.2d 811 (1988). In Spiess, the plaintiff's claim was based on 
the actions of his wife's psychiatrist, who engaged in sexual relations with her during 
the course of treatment that was intended to preserve the marriage. The plaintiff 
alleged that he suffered severe emotional distress as a result. The defendant argued 
that the plaintiff's claim was actually a claim for alienation of affections and criminal 
conversation. The court of appeals rejected the claim: 
[C]riminal conversation consists of sexual intercourse with the spouse of an-
other person, and the elements of alienation of affection are wrongful con-
duct of the defendant which is intended to cause and which actually does 
cause the plaintiff the loss of the affection and consortium of the pwintiff's spouse. 
The gravamen of the tort of intentional infliction of severe emotional dis-
tress, on the other hand, is that the plaintiff has suffered a loss due to intention-
ally inflicted severe emotional distress. It is the nature of the loss allegedly suffered 
by plaintiff in this case that distinguishes his claim of intentional infliction of 
severe emotional distress from the torts of alienation of affections and crimi-
nal conversation. He claims to have suffered severe emotional distress as a 
result of Johnson's alleged intentional conduct; his claimed loss is not the 
loss of his wife's society and companionship. That Johnson allegedly used 
his sexual relationship with plaintiff's wife as the means to intentionally inflict 
severe emotional distress on plaintiff does not transform plaintiff's claim 
into one for either alienation of affections or criminal conversation. 
Spiess, 748 P.2d at 1023-24 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
In Figueiredo-Torres v. Nickel, 584 A.2d 69 (Md. 1991), the court took the same 
position on similar facts: 
The gravamen of Torres' claim for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress is not merely the sexual act or the alienation of his wife's affections. It 
is the entire course of conduct engaged in by his therapist, with whom he 
enjoyed a special relationship. This conduct constitutes more than the abol-
ished amatory causes of action. On the record before us, we hold that 
Torres' claims for professional negligence and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress should not have been dismissed by the trial court. 
/d. at 77. 
337. In Raftery v. Scott, 756 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1985), for example, the Fourth 
Circuit concluded that Virginia's abolition of the alienation of affections action did 
not bar a claim by a father against the mother for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress based on her attempts to tum the child against him. Although tinged with 
the alienation of affections action, the court concluded that intentional infliction of 
emotional distress is an independent tort. Id. at 339. 
338. Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39, 44-47 (Minn. 1990). 
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emotional distress. The differences in the elements of the torts 
and the high threshold established by the supreme court for 
the intentional infliction of emotional distress should serve to 
avoid the problems that the legislature intended to avoid in 
abrogating alienation of affections actions. 
C. Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations 
In Potthoff v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 339 the court of appeals took 
the position that damages for emotional distress may be com-
pensable for interference with contractual relations.34o The 
plaintiff brought suit against the defendant bus company for 
interfering with the plaintiff's employment with a newly 
formed bus company.341 Suit was based upon the intentional 
interference with contractual relations.342 
The jury found that the defendants had wrongfully inter-
fered with the plaintiff's employment contract and awarded 
him damages for lost income and emotional suffering, as well 
as punitive damages.343 The defendants argued on appeal that 
the plaintiff was not entitled to recover damages for emotional 
suffering.344 
The court of appeals noted that, while damages for emo-
tional suffering are not recoverable in a breach of contract 
case, that limitation does not apply in cases involving inten-
tional interference with contractual relations.345 The trial 
court had relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts in conclud-
ing that damages for emotional harm may be compensable in 
an intentional interference action. Section 774A subdivision 1 
of the Restatement reads: 
One who is liable to another for interference with a contract 
or prospective contractual relation is liable for damages for 
(a) the pecuniary loss of the benefits of the contract or 
the prospective relation; 
339. 363 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). 
340. [d. at 777. 
341. [d. at 773. 
342. [d. 
343. [d. at 774. 
344. Potthoff v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 363 N.W. 2d 771, 773 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1985). 
345. /d. at 777; see also Haagenson v. National Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co., 
277 N.W .. 2d 648, 652 (Minn. 1979). 
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(b) consequential losses for which the interference is a 
legal cause; and 
(c) emotional distress or actual harm to reputation, if 
they are reasonably to be expected to result from the 
interference.346 
The court of appeals affirmed, agreeing "that emotional dis-
tress could be a natural result of interference with contract re-
lations,"347 and that "in appropriate cases emotional distress 
damages are recoverable in this type of action. "348 
Potthoff illustrates the import of a holding allowing recovery 
of damages for emotional distress where one party has inten-
tionally interfered with a contractual relationship. The court 
of appeals held that the plaintiff's injury was insufficient to sus-
tain a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress.349 After the plaintiff lost his job, due to his first 
employer's interference with his contract of employment, the 
plaintiff applied for more than fifty jobs and was rejected. He 
incurred substantial debts, and his mental state was not "too 
good" as a result.350 His mental state related to the difficulties 
he had in not being able to live normally, not having anything 
346. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774A (1979). The Potthoff trial court also 
relied on an Oregon case, Mooney v.Johnson Cattle Co., 634 P.2d 1333 (Or. 1981), 
where the Oregon Supreme Court permitted recovery for emotional distress where 
the injury is "a common and predictable result of disrupting the type of relationship 
or transaction involved." [d. at 1338. 
Comment d to § 774A, discussing damages, reads as follows: 
The action for interference with contract is one in tort and damages are not 
based on the contract rules, and it is not required that the loss incurred be 
one within the contemplation of the parties to the contract itself at the time 
it was made. The plaintiff can also recover for consequential harms, pro· 
vided they were legally caused by the defendant's interference. 
The tests for legal causation for the tort of interference with a contract 
of prospective contractual relation, like the tests for determining when an 
interference is improper ... , have not been reduced to precise rules. By 
analogy to the rules for legal causation for negligent physical injury, it is 
sometimes held that the particular loss need not be contemplated, expected 
or foreseen by the defendant. ... At other times, it is held that the loss must 
be expectable, by analogy to legal causation for the tort of deceit. . . . It 
seems likely that the issue in a particular case may be affected by some of the 
factors listed in § 767. Emphasis may be given, for example, to the means 
used (i.e., physical force or oral persuasion) and to the motive (e.g., intent in 
broad sense of knowledge of result, or sole purpose motivated by ill will). 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774A cmt. d (1979). 
347. Potthoff, 363 N.W.2d at 777. 
348. Potthoffv.Jefferson Lines, Inc., 363 N.W.2d 771, 777 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). 
349. [d. 
350. [d. 
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to do with his time, and not having a sense of self-security.1I51 
Nonetheless, the court held that the finding of intentional 
interference with contractual relations justified the jury in 
awarding the plaintiff damages in the amount of $15,000 for 
the emotional distress he sustained, for the same emotional 
distress that was not independently actionable under the tort 
of intentional infliction of emotional distress.1I52 
D. Misrepresentation and Fraud 
Generally, in Minnesota, damages from fraud and misrepre-
sentation are limited to the out-of-pocket loss sustained by the 
plaintiff.1I511 However, there are variations depending on the 
type of misrepresentation and the damages sustained.1I54 For 
example, damages may be broadened to include recovery for 
injury to reputation and lost profits, even if the damages were 
not within the contemplation of either the wrongdoer or the 
person who relied upon the fraudulent misrepresentations.1I55 
Nevertheless, courts have not conclusively answered whether 
damages may be awarded for emotional suffering that is the 
product of the fraud or misrepresentation. 
In Brooks v. Doherty, Rumble & Butler,1I56 suit was brought by 
an attorney who was discharged by his firm. The plaintiff sued 
for breach of contract, fraud, emotional distress, and defama-
351. Id. 
352. Id. 
353. See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Mesabi Tire Co., 430 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 
1988). 
354. See, e.g., Peterson v. Johnston, 254 N.W.2d 360, 362 (Minn. 1977) (measure 
of damages is the amount paid less the fair market value of the property where the 
fraudulent misrepresentation is made to a buyer of real estate); Lowrey v. Dingmann, 
251 Minn. 124, 127,86 N.W.2d 499, 502 (1957) (where property is purchased in 
reliance on fraudulent misrepresentation and the property is not returned, proper 
measure of damages is difference between actual value of the property received and 
price paid for it, plus other or special damages naturally and proximately caused by 
the fraud before its discovery); Nave v. Dovolos, 395 N.W.2d 393, 398 n.l (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1986) (measure of damages in fraudulent misrepresentation involving the sale 
of real estate is the amount paid less the fair market value of the property); Melin v. 
Johnson, 387 N.W.2d 230, 231-32 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (measure of damages in 
case involving misrepresentation by insurance agent is amount of benefits as repre-
sented minus the benefits actually received); Whitney v. Buttrick, 376 N.W.2d 274, 
280-81 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (measure of damages in case involving negligent mis-
representation of a third party in a collateral matter related to the sale of property is 
not limited to out-of-pocket losses). 
355. See Lowrey, 251 Minn. at 127, 86 N.W.2d at 499. 
356. 481 N.W.2d 120 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), review denied, (Minn. Apr. 29, 1992). 
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tion. The jury returned a special verdict in favor of the plain-
tiff on all issues but the emotional distress claim. Several 
issues were raised on appeal, including the question of 
whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages for both 
breach of contract and fraud in the inducement to the con-
tract. 357 The court of appeals held that the theories were in-
dependent and that damages for both were recoverable. The 
plaintiff had the burden of proof in ~uch a case to establish 
separate damages to avoid a duplicative damages award.358 
The court concluded that the plaintiff had met his burden: 
In his complaint, he alleged that the breach of his employ-
ment contract caused him to suffer a loss of income. In ad-
dition and in contrast, appellant alleged that the fraud 
perpetrated by respondents caused him to enter into a situ-
ation that ultimately caused emotional distress, damage to 
his personal and professional reputation, lost income, and a 
move to Arizona. 
At trial, [plaintiff] presented evidence relevant to the is-
sue of fraud that was separate and distinct from that which 
supported his contract claims. He testified to the long-term 
financial difficulty he and his wife experienced as a conse-
quence of his fraudulent inducement to enter the employ-
ment contract with DRB. In addition, he testified to the 
disgrace of borrowing money to meet expenses; the loss of 
clients; the strain on [him], his wife and their two small chil-
dren; and the anger and depression he experienced. He 
testified that in each interview for employment the firm 
would ask the reasons for his termination, and that no firm 
offered him employment after he divulged this information. 
His inability to procure a job with any firm in Minnesota 
caused him to seek employment in Arizona where he had 
business contacts. The move to Arizona was not by choice, 
because [his] family lives in Minnesota. [Plaintiff], who 
moved first to Arizona, testified that the five-month separa-
tion from his wife and children and their ultimate move 
from Minnesota was difficult and upsetting.359 
The firm's argument that the plaintiff's damages should be 
limited to out-of-pocket loss was rejected by the court of ap-
peals. The direct economic loss he sustained was not covered 
by the out-of-pocket rule nor were the other damages he sus-
357. /d. 
358. /d. 
359. /d. at 128. 
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tained. Notwithstanding the appellant's inability to recover for 
emotional distress as a separate and independent tort, the 
fraud claim appeared to justify recovery for damages beyond 
the out-of-pocket loss.360 
In M.H. & j.L.H. v. Caritas Family Services,361 the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals considered the question of whether a negli-
gent misrepresentation theory of recovery against an adoption 
agency would support damages for emotional distress that re-
sulted from plaintiffs' adoption of a child whose natural par-
ents were siblings. The child was diagnosed as suffering from 
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.362 
The court recognized the claim for negligent misrepresenta-
tion against an adoption agency, concluding that its holding 
did not offend public policy.363 The trial court held that the 
agency's conduct was "not sufficiently egregious to support an 
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim"364 and also 
barred the plaintiffs' claim for the negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress.365 The court of appeals agreed that the facts 
were insufficient to support a claim for the intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress but concluded that the trial court 
should have allowed a claim for the negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress.366 Relying on Lee v. Metropolitan Airport Commis-
sion,367 the court held that a "negligent infliction of emotional 
distress claim is properly pleaded where supported by a sepa-
rately pleaded intentional tort. "368 The court also held that 
the plaintiffs did not have to prove any resulting physical inju-
ries where the claim constituted a direct invasion of the plain-
tiff's rights. Therefore, the court concluded that because "the 
intentional misrepresentation claim may go forward, respon-
dents are entitled to add the negligent infliction of emotional 
360. Id. at 128-29. 
361. 475 N.W.2d 94 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), aJJ'd in part, reIJ'd in part, 488 N.W.2d 
282 (Minn. 1992). For a discussion of the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in 
Cantas, see infra notes 369-74 and accompanying text. 
362. Id. at 97. 
363. Id. at 98. 
364. /d. at 99-100. 
365. /d. at 99. 
366. M.H. &J.L.H. v. Caritas Family Servs., 475 N.W.2d 94, 100 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1991), aJJ'd in part, reIJ'd in part, 488 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1992). 
367. 428 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). 
368. Cantas, 475 N.W.2d at 100. 
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distress claim."369 The Minnesota Supreme Court370 affirmed 
the court of appeals holding permitting the claim for negligent 
misrepresentation to go forward, but reversed the court of ap-
peals' conclusion that the claim for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress supported the plaintiffs' claim for the negligent 
infliction of emotional distress. The supreme court held that 
the plaintiff was not entitled to assert the emotional distress 
claims for two reasons. First, the plaintiffs alleged no physical 
injury to support the claims, and second, the plaintiffs were 
unable to establish a "direct invasion" of their rights by "will-
ful, wanton, or malicious conduct. "371 Once the trial court dis-
missed the plaintiffs' claim for intentional misrepresentation, 
there was no basis for concluding that the defendants engaged 
in willful, wanton, or malicious conduct. 
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Village of Isle,372 
the supreme court held that recovery for mental anguish where 
the plaintiff has not suffered an accompanying physical injury 
will not be allowed "unless there has been some conduct on 
the part of defendant constituting a direct invasion of the 
plaintiff's rights such as that constituting slander, libel, mali-
cious prosecution, seduction, or other like willful, wanton, or 
malicious misconduct. "373 
As the Caritas court noted, there must be a "direct invasion" 
and it must be "willful, wanton, or malicious conduct." The 
requirements are not disjunctive, but conjunctive. The plain-
tiffs failed on both counts. Negligent misrepresentation is not 
the right kind of "direct invasion," and it does not constitute 
"willful, wanton, or malicious conduct." 
Notwithstanding the supreme court's disposition of the case, 
there are two aspects of the court of appeals' decision that ne-
cessitate comment. First, rather than stating that a claim for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress may be asserted once 
a direct invasion of the plaintiff's rights is established, the 
court of appeals may have been more accurate in holding that 
damages for emotional distress might be awarded for inten-
tional misrepresentation without utilizing the negligent mis-
369. [d. 
370. 488 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1992). 
371. [d. at 290 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Village ofIsle, 265 Minn. 
360,367-68, 122 N.W.2d 36,41 (1963». 
372. 265 Minn. 360, 367-68, 122 N.W.2d 36, 41 (1963). 
373. Id. at 367-68, 122 N.W.2d at 41. 
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representation language. A claim for emotional distress is 
contingent upon establishing the underlying intentional tort. 
Thus, any award of damages for emotional suffering is a prod-
uct not of proof of negligence, but rather of the intentional 
tort claim. Recognizing that the right to recover for emotional 
suffering as a product of the intentional tort avoids any ten-
dency to incorporate the more restrictive requirements for the 
award of damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress, 
especially the physical disability requirement. Where the dis-
tress is caused by the defendant's intentional conduct, the 
plaintiff should be entitled to recover for that distress without 
meeting any additional requirements imposed by the law of 
negligence. 
Second, no clear rationale can be gleaned from the court's 
opinion for allowing recovery of damages for emotional dis-
tress in misrepresentation actions. The predominant position 
in such cases is to limit recovery for damages to pecuniary 
loss.374 
The same concerns that limit the right to recover in cases 
involving breach of contract claims justify limiting the right to 
recover in cases where the essence of the claim is misconduct 
with respect to a commercial or business transaction. As Pro-
fessor Dobbs has noted: 
In general, it would seem that so long as the plaintiff's re-
covery is based on an intentional fraud and nothing else, 
the tort policy of allowing a broad range of damages, pro-
vided they are proved with adequate certainty, should be 
followed. To the extent that the plaintiff's claim is based on 
something like mutual mistake, or strict liability, special 
damages may appropriately be limited or denied altogether. 
But even if a broad range of damages is to be permitted 
in cases of intentional fraud, it must be remembered that 
deceit is an economic, not a dignitary tort, and resembles, 
in the interests it seeks to protect, a contract claim more 
than a tort claim. For this reason, though strong men may 
cry at the loss of money, separate recovery for mental 
anguish is usually denied in deceit cases, just as it is denied 
in contract cases, simply because emotional distress, though 
resulting naturally enough from many frauds, is not one of 
the interests the law ordinarily seeks to protect in deceit 
374. See Andrew L. Mernn, Damages for Emotional Distress in Fraud Litigation: Digni-
tary Torts in a Commercial Society, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1,3-4 (1989). 
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cases.375 
Where the plaintiff's claim arises out of a business transac-
tion, the losses should be limited to the business or pecuniary 
losses that arise from the transaction. However, a court should 
take into account losses such as injury to reputation or credit 
rating376 but not recovery for emotional distress, unless that 
distress is probable from the nature of the representation 
involved. 
A variety of approaches to the issue are possible.377 How-
ever, if there is to be a general acceptance of the right to re-
cover damages for emotional distress in fraud litigation, it will 
have to be based on recognition of fraud as a dignitary tort, 
rather than a tort implicating only pecuniary interests.378 Ab-
sent such a recognition, permitting recovery for emotional dis-
tress under circumstances where personal interests are affected 
at least offers a middle position that justifies the result in the 
Caritas case, yet raises questions about the award of damages 
for emotional distress in Brooks. Brooks, on the other hand, of-
fers compelling reasons for rejecting any rigid distinction be-
tween business and personal transactions. 
E. Legal Malpractice 
In a legal malpractice action, the plaintiff is obligated to 
prove: (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; and 
375. DAN B. DOBBS. REMEDIES § 9.2. at 602 (1973). 
376. In Autrey v. Trkla. 350 N.W.2d 409. 412 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). the court of 
appeals noted that recovery under the out-of-pocket rule normally will limit the 
plaintiff to the recovery of the difference between what the plaintiff parted with and 
what the plaintiff received. but the court created an exception in cases where the 
plaintiff would be uncompensated for damages caused by the misrepresentation 
under the out-of-pocket rule. Uncompensated damages in Whitney v. Buttrick. 376 
N.W.2d 274 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). included the tax liability for the sale of property. 
The court held that the out-of-pocket measure of damages was irrelevant because the 
harm arose not out of the sale. "but rather out of the negligent misrepresentation of 
a third party in a collateral. but related. transaction to the sale." !d. at 280. 
The court of appeals concluded in Whitney that the plaintiff should have been 
instructed that the defendant 
could be found liable for damages proximately resulting from his negligent 
misrepresentation that he could structure the sale with no tax. The court 
should also have instructed the jury that the taxes paid could be an element 
of those damages if the jury found from the evidence that the sale could 
have been structured in a manner to yield a tax liability of less than [the 
actual amount assessed]. 
Id. at 281. 
377. See Merritt. supra note 373. at 7-15. 
378. Id. at 38. 
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(2) that the plaintiff sustained damages because of the attor-
ney's negligence or breach of contract. 379 The plaintiff is enti-
tled to recover for all damages proximately caused by the 
attorney's negligence or breach of contract. For example, in a 
case where an attorney fails to file an action within the statute 
of limitations, the attorney's liability will be for the damages 
that would have been recovered had the action been filed. 
Consequential damages may be recovered in cases involving 
negligent misrepresentation, with no out-of-pocket loss limita-
tion on damages.38o The right to recover for other damages, 
including damages for emotional distress arising out of legal 
malpractice, is less clear. 
In Gillespie v. Klun,381 suit for legal malpractice was brought 
against an attorney who represented the Gillespies in purchas-
ing an apartment building on a contract for deed. The attor-
ney drew up the purchase agreement and the contract for 
deed, representing both the purchasers and sellers in different 
capacities.382 He continued that representation after problems 
with the apartment created an adverse situation between the 
purchasers and sellers. The purchasers signed documents pre-
pared by the attorney that they believed canceled the contract 
for deed. The papers were an agreement, a confession of 
judgment, and a quit claim deed that required the purchasers 
to execute a confession of judgment in favor of the sellers for 
all the debts that were incurred during the purchasers' posses-
sion of the apartment building, and to waive their statutory re-
demption right. 383 As a result, the purchasers experienced 
financial and personal problems. The jury awarded damages 
for injury to the purchasers' credit and emotional distress. 
The court of appeals held that "[e]xtra contractual damages 
are not recoverable for breach of contract unless the breach is 
accompanied by an independent tort," but since the record 
379. See, e.g., Christy v. Salitennan, 288 Minn. 144, 150, 179 N.W.2d 288, 293-944 
(1970). In cases where the defendant-attorney has failed to take some action or raise 
some defense, the plaintiff must prove "(1) the existence of an attorney-client rela-
tionship; (2) acts constituting negligence or breach of contract; (3) that such acts 
were the proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages; (4) that but for defendant's con-
duct the plaintiff would have been successful in the prosecution or defense of the 
action." Blue Water Corp. v. O'Toole, 336 N.W.2d 279, 281 (Minn. 1983). 
380. See Whitney v. Buttrick, 376 N.W.2d 274, 281 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). 
381. 406 N.W.2d 547 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), review denied, (Minn. July 9, 1987). 
382. [d. at 549. . 
383. [d. at 550. 
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supported a finding of negligence, the award of damages for 
emotional distress was appropriate.384 
There is no clear rationale for the court's decision. While 
causation between the defendant's malpractice and the plain-
tiffs' emotional distress was established, the court did not ad-
dress the policy problems raised in permitting recovery of 
damages for emotional injury in malpractice actions. The ma-
jority rule is to permit recovery of damages for emotional dis-
tress if the defendant-attorney acted egregiously or the 
plaintiff suffered physical injury. 385 Various factors mitigate 
against a ready acceptance of the right to recover damages for 
emotional distress in malpractice actions, including the fear of 
spurious claims and the recognition that, in virtually all cases 
where there is an adverse result, the clients will suffer at least 
some degree of emotional injury.386 
There is a trend toward recognition of the claim for emo-
tional distress, depending on whether the interest of the client 
is pecuniary or personal. Where pecuniary damages for emo-
tional distress may be rigidly limited, but the interest is per-
sonal and the damage results in loss of liberty, the client may 
recover for emotional distress.387 
F. Invasion of Privacy 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has not yet recognized the 
tort of invasion of privacy. 388 When the courts have discussed 
the tort, they have used Prosser's classification scheme, which 
breaks the tort into four separate types of invasion of privacy: 
(1) unreasonable intrusion upon another's seclusion; (2) ap-
propriation of another's name or likeness; (3) unreasonable 
publicity to the private life of another; and (4) publicity unrea-
sonably placing another person in a false light in the public 
eye.389 
384. Id. at 558. 
385. See Joseph J. Kelleher, Note, An Attorney s Liability for the Negligent Infliction of 
Emotional Distress, 58 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 1309, 1319 (1990). 
386. Id. 
387. Id. at 1320-21. 
388. See Hendry v. Conner, 303 Minn. 317, 319, 226 N.W.2d 921,923 (1975); 
Stubbs v. North Memorial Medical CtT., 448 N.W.2d 78, 81 (Minn. Cl. App. 1989), 
review denied, (Minn. Jan. 12, 1990); Bohdan v. Alltool Mfg. Co., 411 N.W.2d 902, 906 
(Minn. Cl. App. 1987), review denied, (Minn. Nov. 13, 1987); Tibbetts v. Crossroads, 
Inc., 411 N.W.2d 535, 538 (Minn. Cl. App. 1987). 
389. Stubbs, 448 N.W.2d at 80 (citation omitted). 
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The void created by the lack of a recognized action for inva-
sion of privacy is illustrated by the Minnesota Court of Ap-
peals decision in Stubbs v. North Memorial Medical Center. 390 The 
plaintiff was a patient of a physician who performed cosmetic 
surgery on her. The physician photographed her nose and 
chin before and after surgery.391 Later, the hospital began cir-
culating the photographs of the plaintiff.392 She did not con-
sent to the publication of the photographs.393 
The plaintiff claimed that because of the circulation of the 
photographs, she "lost sleep, and had sore throats, cold sores 
and headaches."394 While noting the need for a tort to provide 
redress in cases where unwanted publicity is given to some pri-
vate aspect of a person's life, the court, constrained by the 
"long established rule in Minnesota" held that "invasion of 
privacy is not recognized as a cause of action" and dismissed 
the privacy claim.395 
The plaintiff also asserted a claim for the intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress against the physician and hospitaJ.396 
However, the court noted that the plaintiff's allegations did 
not meet the severity standard of Hubbard and dismissed the 
claim.397 
While an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim 
can parallel a privacy claim, the elements of an emotional dis-
tress claim are more difficult to establish, as Stubbs so clearly 
indicates. The level of severity required by the intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress claim is unnecessary in a privacy 
claim. If invasion of privacy is recognized as a separate tort, 
then it should be an independent tort supporting the recovery 
of damages for emotional distress, even if the plaintiff is un-
able to meet the elements of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. 
390. [d. 
391. [d. al79. 
392. [d. al 79-80. 
393. Slubbs v. North Memorial Medical Clr., 448 N.W.2d 78, 80 (Minn Ct. App. 
1989), review denied, (Minn. Jan. 12, 1990). 
394. [d. 
395. [d. al81. 
396. [d. al 80. 
397. [d. al81. 
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G. Defamation 
Claimants will frequently assert both defamation!l98 and in-
tentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims 
in the same complaint. !l99 That practice raises questions con-
cerning the relationship between the claims. 
It is clear that recovery for defamation will support the 
award of damages for emotional distress.4oo The primary issue 
that arises is whether defamation law imposes a limitation on 
the right to recover damages for emotional distress when the 
defamation claims fails. The answer depends, in part, on 
whether the plaintiff asserted a claim for the negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress or the intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress and, in part, on the reason for the failure of the 
defamation claim. 
1. Defamation and Intentional Infliction oj Emotional Distress 
The Minnesota Supreme Court and the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals have repeatedly stated that recovery for negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress is allowed only if the plaintiff is 
within the zone of danger of a physical impact, fears for her 
own safety, and suffers emotional distress as established by 
physical injury or manifestations. An exception exists when 
the plaintiff suffers a direct invasion of her rights, such as "def-
amation, malicious prosecution or other willful or malicious 
conduct. "40 1 
Where the plaintiff asserts claims for defamation ~nd the 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, the answer should be 
relatively simple. Recovery under the defamation theory sup-
ports recovery for consequent emotional harm; failure of the 
defamation claim precludes recovery for emotional distress 
under the negligence theory. However, the cases are in con-
398. Defamation requires proof of a defamatory statement that is false, that refers 
to the plaintiff, and that is published. See, e.g., Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 
N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn. 1980). 
399. See, e.g., Strauss v. Thorne, 490 N.W.2d 908 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). 
400. See State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Village ofIsle, 265 Minn. 360, 367-
68, 122 N.W.2d 36, 41 (1963); Bradley v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 471 N.W.2d 
670,677 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, (Minn. Aug. 2, 1992). 
401. Langeland v. Farmers State Bank, 319 N.W.2d 26, 31 (1982) (citing State 
Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Village ofisle, 265 Minn. 360,122 N.W.2d 36 (1963»; 
see also Strauss v. Thorne, 490 N.W.2d 908, 912 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); Bohdan v. 
Alltool Mfg. Co., 411 N.W.2d 902, 907 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), review denied, (Minn. 
Nov. 13, 1987). 
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flict concerning the mechanics and propriety of submitting 
claims for defamation and negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress, particularly when the defamation claim fails. 
In Covey v. Detroit Lakes Printing Co. ,402 the court of appeals 
considered the relationship between a defamation claim and 
claims for the intentional and negligent infliction of emotional 
distress. The plaintiffs sued the Detroit Lakes Printing Com-
pany because it printed an article concerning a murder that oc-
curred outside the trailer home of some of their relatives 
which, by implication, defamed the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs 
sued for "negligent defamation, negligent and intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress, and libel per se."403 In answer to 
special verdict questions, the jury found that the newspaper 
was negligent in publishing the article, that the paper's negli-
gence was a direct cause of the plaintiffs' injury, and that the 
plaintiffs sustained damages of approximately $100,000 for 
their embarrassment, mental distress and humiliation.404 
However, the jury also found that the article could not reason-
ably be understood to refer to the plaintiffs.405 Based on the 
latter finding, the trial court dismissed the negligent defama-
tion claim and refused to award any damages to the plaintiffs. 
The trial court had previously granted summary judgment for 
the paper on the plaintiffs' claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress and a directed verdict on their claim for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress.406 
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment on 
the intentional infliction of emotional distress issue, conclud-
ing that the plaintiffs' injuries did not reach the level of sever-
ity required by the tort.407 
The court of appeals, however, concluded that the trial court 
should have allowed the claim for the negligent infliction of 
emotional distress to go to the jury.408 While the evidence of 
physical manifestation of the emotional distress was minimal, 
the court of appeals found the level was sufficient to take the 
402. 490 N.W.2d 138 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). 
403. Id. at 141. 
404. [d. 
405. [d. 
406. Id. 
407. Covey v. Detroit Lakes Printing Co., 490 N.W.2d 138, 144 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1992). 
408. [d. 
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case to the jury. However, the court held that the trial court's 
error was harmless, given the jury's findings on the defamation 
claims.409 
The court's conclusion concerning the claim for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress is questionable, because the 
defamation claim supported the claim for emotional distress 
and other mental suffering-not the separate claim for negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress. It seems clear that the 
negligent infliction of emotional distress claim would be super-
fluous, both theoretically and in the context of the case. The 
separate and independent defamation claim, supporting a 
claim for emotional distress, stands on its own. If the plaintiff 
establishes the defamation claim, the plaintiff is entitled to re-
cover for the emotional suffering engendered by the defama-
tory statements. If the plaintiff loses on the defamation claim, 
for whatever reason, the claim for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress cannot stand independently. Because it is su-
perfluous, the trial court's directed verdict on the issue 
appears to be correct. 
Covey appears to be in conflict with the court of appeals' 
opinion in Strauss v. Thome,410 decided a month later. In 
Strauss, the trial court held that dismissal on a motion for sum-
mary judgment of the plaintiff's defamation claim also necessi-
tated dismissal of the plaintiff's claim for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress. The court of appeals concluded that, be-
cause the trial court's dismissal of the defamation claim was 
erroneous, the plaintiff was "entitled to have her claim of neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress considered on remand as 
well. "411 By implication, had the court upheld the dismissal of 
the defamation claim, the claim for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress could have not been considered. 
If Strauss is correct, then the court in Covey is incorrect in 
sending a message to trial courts to instruct juries on negligent 
infliction of emotional distress, even if there are physical mani-
festations of the emotional distress. If the defamation claim 
does not succeed, the basis for recovery for emotional harm 
also evaporates, unless some other tort claim justifies recovery 
for that harm. 
409. ld. 
410. 490 N.W.2d 908 (Minn. Cl. App. 1992). 
411. Id.at912. 
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2. Defamation and Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress-Limitations 
87 
Intentional infliction of emotional distress claims are fre-
quently asserted with defamation claims. This practice raises a 
question concerning the relationship of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress to defamation claims. The limitations to 
negligent infliction of emotional distress are inapplicable to a 
claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Inten-
tional infliction of emotiorial distress, unlike the claim for neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress, stands alone. The 
plaintiff's right to recover for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress does not depend on his ability to establish the 
defamation claim. Thus, the issue becomes whether defama-
tion law, nonetheless, establishes a baseline or limitation that 
precludes recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress under some circumstances. 
The fact that a plaintiff is not entitled to recover for defama-
tion should not automatically preclude recovery for the inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. Rather, the impact of 
the dismissal of the defamation claim should be dependent on 
the basis for the claim of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress. For example, the defamation claim might be only a small 
part of an overall pattern of harassment. If so, the fact that the 
plaintiff is not entitled to recover for defamation should not 
necessarily preclude recovery for the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. Conversely, if the conduct that gives rise to 
both the defamation and emotional distress claims is the same, 
arguably the plaintiff should not be able to circumvent limita-
tions on defamation recovery simply by recasting the claim as 
one for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. This is 
particularly true where strong policy reasons exist to limit or to 
deny the defamation claim. 
If the plaintiff alleges intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, then this claim may justify recovery for the emotional 
harm sustained by the plaintiff, irrespective of the disposition 
of the defamation claim. The courts have not explored this 
relationship in detail, but the basic question is whether a plain-
tiff, barred from recovering for defamation, should also be 
barred from recovering under the theory of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. 
There are a variety of reasons why a defamation claim may 
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fail or be limited: (1) the plaintiff may be barred by First 
Amendment limitations under the federal constitution or its 
state equivalent; (2) the fact/opinion limitation may apply, pre-
cluding recovery for an opinion; (3) a common law absolute or 
qualified privilege may apply, precluding recovery for defama-
tion either because the privilege is absolute or because the 
plaintiff is unable to make the showing necessary to overcome 
the qualified privilege; (4) the plaintiff also may be unable to 
recover anything other than special damages because of a fail-
ure to demand a retraction; (5) the plaintiff may fail to prove 
one of the essential elements of the defamation claim; or (6) in 
a slander case, the plaintiff may lose because he is unable to 
establish either slander per se or pecuniary loss. 
a. First Amendment Limitations 
In cases where the plaintiff is a public official or figure seek-
ing to recover damages for emotional injury based on defama-
tory statements, it is clear that the First Amendment 
limitations of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan will apply.412 In 
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,413 the Supreme Court took the 
following position: 
[P]ublic figures and public officials may not recover for the 
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason 
of publications such as the one here at issue without show-
ing in addition that the publication contains a false state-
ment of fact which was made with "actual malice," i.e., with 
knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless dis-
regard as to whether or not it was true. This is not merely a 
blind application of the New York Times standard, ... it re-
flects our considered judgment that such a standard is nec-
essary to give adequate "breathing space" to the freedoms 
protected by the First Amendment.414 
The same limitation logically extends to any situation where 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 415 applies, even where a private per-
son is involved, so long as the case involves a situation where 
the plaintiff has the burden of proving the falsity of a state-
ment. In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,416 the Court held 
412. 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
413. 485 u.s. 46 (1988). 
414. Id. at 56. 
415. 418 u.s. 323 (1974). 
416. 475 u.s. 767 (1986). 
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that in cases where the publication concerning a private person 
is about a matter of public concern, the plaintiff has the burden 
of proving the falsity of the statement. 
If Gertz applies and a claimant asserts claims for both defa-
mation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, the 
Court would likely reach the same result as in Falwell. The 
plaintiff would have to prove the falsity of the statement, and 
an inability to do so would preclude recovery for defamation. 
The plaintiff would not be able to avoid the constitutionallimi-
tations in such a case by pleading the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. 
b. Fact/opinion Dichotomy 
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress may 
also be limited by defamation law's fact/opinion dichotomy, 
even if not constitutionally compelled.417 In situations where 
the defendant defames the plaintiff, and the plaintiff is a public 
figure or official, or the statement concerns a public issue, the 
same limitation in Falwell applies to preclude recovery. The 
plaintiff's inability to establish a false statement of fact means 
that recovery is precluded under New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van.41S Thus, if the defamatory statement does not imply the 
417. In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990), the Supreme Court 
held that there is no constitutionally mandated protection of opinion. However, in 
Diesen v. Hessburg, 455 N.W.2d 446 (Minn. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1071 
(1991), decided before Milkovich, the Minnesota Supreme Court anticipated the 
Supreme Court's holding and held that the fact/opinion distinction rests on state law 
grounds: 
We reiterate that like protected opinion and "fair comment" on public offi-
cials, "[t]he doctrine of privileged communication rests upon public policy 
considerations [and] results from the court's determination that statements 
made in particular contexts or on certain occasions should be encouraged 
despite the risk that the statements might be defamatory .... " Thus, while 
first amendment and other policy considerations underlie this restraint, we 
note our decision here is rooted in state defamation law. 
455 N.W.2d at 452 (citation omitted). 
418. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In Huyen v. Driscoll, 479 N.W.2d 76 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1991), the plaintiff, a public official, argued to the court of appeals that Milkovich 
abolished constitutional protection for opinions. The court of appeals disagreed: 
The United States Supreme Court recently determined freedom of ex-
pression "is adequately secured by existing constitutional doctrine without 
the creation of an artificial dichotomy between 'opinion' and fact." ... After 
stating that the appellate courts' fact/opinion analysis mistakenly relied on 
dicta in Gertz, the Court said all statements of opinion are not automatically 
protected by the first amendment. ... Citing existing law, the Court clari-
fied that only statements regarding matters of public concern which are not 
sufficiently factual to be capable of being proven true or false, and state-
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existence of facts, recovery for defamation will be pre-
cluded.419 If the fact/opinion distinction limits recovery for 
defamation it would also appear to be applicable to claims for 
the intentional infliction of emotional distress where the emo-
tional distress claim is based on the same statement or 
statements.420 
c. Oy,alified Privileges 
Where common law absolute or qualified privileges apply,421 
the plaintiff may also be precluded from recovery for both def-
amation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. If an 
absolute privilege applies, the plaintiff may not recover for def-
amation, even if the defendant uttered the statement with com-
mon law actual malice. If a qualified privilege applies, the 
plaintiff may overcome the privilege by showing common law 
actual malice or abuse of the privilege.422 If an absolute privi-
lege applies, or a qualified privilege applies and the plaintiff is 
unable to make the showing necessary to overcome the privi-
lege, the policies underlying the privilege seem to be strong 
enough to preclude recovery for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress where the emotional distress claim is based on 
the same statements that the defendant was privileged to make 
ments which cannot be reasonably interpreted as stating actual facts, are 
absolutely protected by the first amendment .... Thus, contrary to Huyen's 
argument, Milkovich did not abolish constitutional protection for opinions, 
but instead merely narrowed the privilege. 
Id. at 79. 
419. See, e.g., Huyen, 479 N.W.2d at 79-80. 
420. However, in cases where there is no constitutional limitation flowing from 
Falwell, the court of appeals has noted that at common law there is no fact/opinion 
distinction. See Bradley v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 471 N.W.2d 670, 673-74 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, (Minn. Aug. 2, 1991). 
If the statement implies or states facts, the statement may not be protected 
"opinion" and is therefore actionable. See Yetman v. English, 811 P.2d 323 (Ariz. 
1991). In Yetman, a county supervisor brought suit against a state legislator who 
called the supervisor a "communist." The court held that the jury must determine 
whether the statement implied or stated facts about the plaintiff. 
421. The existence of the privilege is a question of law for the court. See Lewis v. 
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876, 890 (Minn. 1986). The plaintiff has 
the burden of proving abuse of the privilege. See id.; Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & 
Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Minn. 1980). Common law actual malice differs from New 
York Times Co. actual malice. Common law malice necessitates a showing that the 
defendant "made the statement from ill will and improper motives, or causelessly 
and wantonly for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff." McKenzie v. William]. Burns 
Int'l Detective Agency, 149 Minn. 311, 312,183 N.W. 516, 517 (1921). 
422. See supra note 421. 
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pursuant to an absolute or qualified privilege.423 For example, 
an absolute privilege protecting participants in a judicial pro-
ceeding from defamation claims should also bar recovery for 
any ancillary torts based on the same testimony. The policy 
favoring open disclosure and free expression would be chilled 
if the prohibition against libel claims could be circumvented by 
simply recasting the claim in another form.424 
In each of the situations discussed in this section, it should 
also be clear that the privileges, whether First Amendment or 
common law, should not provide protection for statements 
that exceed the boundaries of the privilege. Where these state-
ments do exceed the boundaries, defamation and other tort ac-
tions, including a claim for the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, should be available.425 
423. See, e.g., Kanengiser v. Kanengiser, 590 A.2d 1223 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1991). In Kanengiser, an attorney, who received a letter written by another attorney 
on behalf of a client, brought suit, alleging four causes of action. The principal claim 
was that the letter was libelous and actionable per se. The court concluded that the 
letter was absolutely privileged because it was preliminary to a judicial proceeding. 
That privilege also barred other claims, including the non-libel causes of action, such 
as the allegation for an "extortionate demand:" 
This rule is predicated on the common sense observation that the privi-
lege exists to counteract the chilling effect that the potential for civil liability 
would otherwise have on the participants in judicial proceedings. This chil-
ling effect would exist regardless of the tag that plaintiff attaches to his cause 
of action. 
/d. at 1234. 
See also Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564, 569 (1959), where the Supreme Court stated 
that the absolute liability from libel accorded to federal officials will also immunize 
them from liability for "kindred torts" arising out of the same statements. 
424. In Rainier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, Inc., 117 A.2d 889 (NJ. 1955), 
the New Jersey Supreme Court explained the reasons why a privilege from a libel 
action for disclosures in a dispute resolution proceeding also barred ancillary torts: 
The libel action privilege grows out of the public policy favoring free 
expression in statutorily-required informal dispute resolution proceedings, 
without fear of ensuing libel action, short of outright lies or reckless disre-
gard of falsity. An action for tortious interference based on the same verbal 
conduct would equally chill the free expression we seek to protect. 
/d. at 895. The court also stated that "[i]f the policy, which in defamation actions 
affords an absolute privilege or immunity to statements made in judicial and quasi-
judicial proceedings is really to mean anything then we must not permit its circum-
vention by affording an almost equally unrestricted action under a different label." 
/d. 
425. See, e.g., S & W Seafoods Co. v. Jacor Broadcasting, 390 S.E.2d 228 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1989), cert. denied, (Ga. Feb. 15, 1990). The owner and manager ofa restaurant 
brought suit against an Atlanta radio station for defamation, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, negligence, invasion of privacy, and tortious interference with 
business relations, based on comments made by a radio talk show host during the 
course of a restaurant review portion of his talk-show. The defamation claim was 
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d. Retraction Defense 
If the defamation claim is limited because the plaintiff failed 
to demand a retraction, arguably the plaintiff should not· be 
able to circumvent that limitation by making an ancillary tort 
claim for the same harm. The policy that underlies the retrac-
tion statute-providing the newspaper with an opportunity to 
minimize damages by retracting a defamatory statement-is 
strong enough to justify preclusion of the ancillary tort. 
e. Failure to Prove an Essential Element 
If the plaintiff's defamation claim fails because she is unable 
to establish an essential element of the defamation claim, that 
same finding may preclude recovery for the intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. For example, if the defendant did 
not intend to refer to the plaintiff, the plaintiff may be unable 
to establish the necessary intent to inflict emotional distress on 
her. At the very least, a finding that the defendant did not in-
tend to refer to the plaintiff but did intend to inflict emotional 
distress on the plaintiff, creates the possibility of a perverse 
verdict. 
Other limitations, such as lack of publication, should not be 
a defense to the claim for the intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. Publication is not an essential element of the 
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and it 
seems apparent that the emotional distress claim could be es-
tablished, notwithstanding the lack of publication of the de-
famatory statements that caused the plaintiff to suffer 
dismissed on summary judgment because the comments made on the talk show slam-
ming the restaurant and the owner-manager either were not shown to have been false 
or because the statements were protected speech. However, while some of the com-
ments were protected expression, the court concluded that the protection did not 
extend to comments made by the host that encouraged listeners to "[g]o by and see 
this guy Weinberg at S & W on Roswell Road [and] [t]ell him he stinks," to "go by 
and spit in his face for me," and to "[g]o by there today and give a little five fingers in 
the face ... to [him]." Id. at 231. 
The court concluded that the words were not protected because they were calcu-
lated "to provoke an imminent breach of the peace." The court reached the same 
conclusion with respect to the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Id. 
Judge Pope, in dissent, argued that all the words, including those that the major-
ity perceived to be "fighting words," were constitutionally protected. The exhorta-
tions were not such that they could reasonably have been interpreted by listeners as 
imminent direction to assault Weinberg, and, although the words were obnoxious, 
they were entitled to constitutional protection. Id. at 233 (Pope, J., dissenting). 
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emotional distress. There are no strong policy reasons such as 
those that support the absolute and qualified privileges that 
should preclude recovery for emotional distress where the 
harmful statement is not published. 
The same should be true if the words are simply not found 
to be defamatory. In such a case there would be no more rea-
son to deny the emotional distress claim than in a case where 
the plaintiff alleged assault and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, and the assault claim failed. 
h. Slander 
If the plaintiff is unable to recover in a slander action be-
cause the statements are not slander per se or the plaintiff is 
unable to establish pecuniary loss flowing from the slanderous 
statement, the same analysis should apply. The limitations on 
the right to recover for slander are not supported by the policy 
considerations that underlie first amendment or common law 
absolute or qualified privileges. While those policy considera-
tions may preclude claims for emotional distress where the 
privileges apply, the inapplicability of the privileges and limit-
ing policies should mean that the plaintiff should be entitled to 
go forward with the emotional distress claim when the slander 
claim fails for a reason not associated with the limiting policy. 
H. Wrongful Death 
Minnesota Statutes section 573.02 seemingly allows for re-
covery of only pecuniary loss in wrongful death cases.426 Fuss-
ner v. Andert,427 decided in 1961, is the key Minnesota Supreme 
Court case on the definition of pecuniary loss in wrongful 
death actions. The case arose out of the death of a family'S 
daughter.428 The court discussed the elements of recoverable 
loss for a wrongful death action of a child: 
We cannot agree that loss of earnings, contributions, and 
services in terms of dollars represents the only real loss the 
parent sustains by the death of his child. With the passage 
of time the significance of money loss has been diminished. 
Conversely, there is a growing appreciation of the true 
426. "The recovery in the action is ... the pecuniary loss resulting from the death 
.... " MINN. STAT. § 573.02(1) (1990). 
427. 261 Minn. 347, 113 N.W.2d 355 (1961). 
428. Id. at 348, 113 N.W.2d at 356. 
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value to the parent of the rewards which flow from the fam-
ily relationship and are manifested in acts of material aid, 
comfort, and assistance which were once considered to be only of senti-
mental character.429 
The court provided a historical perspective to the recovery 
of wrongful death damages: 
An examination of these and other authorities compels the 
conclusion that courts and juries in the exercise of their 
judgment and experience have not conformed to the lim-
ited pecuniary-loss test. It should be no secret to the bar or 
the courts that jurors have circumvented the test in order to 
provide substantial recoveries which they feel are equitable 
under the circumstances. Courts have sanctioned this prac-
tice by holding that such verdicts are not excessive. It ap-
pears from a review of our authorities that damages are 
awarded not only on the basis of contributions and such 
services as the evidence may establish but for those addi-
tional elements of loss within the broad definition of society 
and companionship which include aid, advice, comfort, and protec-
tion which the survivor might reasonably expect from the 
decedent and which, while not having an easily determined 
market value, are fully justified since they are elements of 
loss for which money can supply a practical substitute.43o 
The court then indicated how the jury should be instructed 
in a wrongful death case: 
The jurors should be told that where the evidence warrants 
recovery the survivor may be compensated not only for ac-
tual pecuniary loss of contributions and services but should 
be compensated as well for loss of advice, comfort, assist-
ance, and protection which the jury might find to be of pe-
cuniary value and which the survivor could reasonably have 
expected if the decedent had lived.431 
Fussner expanded the recoverable elements of damage in a 
wrongful death action for the death of a child. The same ex-
tension applies to cases involving the death of adults. In the 
1988 decision of Ferguson v. Orr,432 the court of appeals dis-
cussed the recoverable losses in a case involving the wrongful 
death of an adult. The issue concerned the jury's award of 
429. Id. at 353, 113 N.W.2d at 359 (emphasis added). 
430. Id. at 358-59, 113 N.W.2d at 362 (emphasis added). 
431. Id. at 359, 113 N.W.2d at 363. 
432. 427 N.W.2d 732 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), review denied, (Minn. Oct. 26, 1988). 
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zero damages.433 The court held that the evidence did not 
support the zero award, concluding that the decedent "regu-
larly contributed money, advice, comfort and companionship" 
to her mother, children and grandchildren.434 
Other Minnesota decisions confirm that some elements of 
emotional damages are recoverable for wrongful death. For 
example, in Jones v. Fisher,435 the Minnesota Supreme Court 
said that damages under the wrongful death act are measured 
by " 'pecuniary loss resulting from the death' and include ad-
vice, counsel, and loss of companionship."436 In another deci-
sion, Johnson v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc. ,437 the supreme 
court held that damages for wrongful death include "compan-
ionship, care and advice."438 
In Steinbrecher v. McLeod Cooperative Power Ass'n,439 the Minne-
sota Court of Appeals discussed the recoverable elements in a 
wrongful death case involving extraordinary psychological 
harm to the decedent's surviving spouse: 
All the evidence indicates that Michael was the glue that 
held her together. He provided Mary advice, comfort, 
assistance and protection. He enabled her to lead a normal 
life. 
Fussner explicitly distinguished between advice and com-
fort and mental anguish. Later cases refine the distinction 
Existing case law subsumes the idea of "comfort" into the 
definition of pecuniary 10ss.440 
The lack of clarity in these cases indicates that the distinction 
between the elements of damage in wrongful death cases is 
blurred. Furthermore, the cases imply recoverable damages 
may justifiably include not only the elements specifically 
set out in the current model JIG 180441 but also loss of 
companionship. 
433. /d. at 734. 
434. Id. at 735. 
435. 309 N.W.2d 726 (Minn. 1981). 
436. [d. at 730. 
437. 420 N.W.2d 608 (Minn. 1988). 
438. Id. at 611 (citing Gray v. Goodson, 378 P.2d 413, 419 (Wash. 1963». 
439. 392 N.W.2d 709 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). 
440. [d. at 714-15 (citations omitted). 
441. MINNESOTA PRACTICE, CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDE 180 (3d. ed. 1986) pro-
vides for recovery of, inter alia, counsel, guidance, advice and comfort. 
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v. CONCLUSION 
The law of emotional distress in Minnesota has not changed 
significantly in the last century. Older concepts have been re-
considered in modern explanations, but the approaches have 
remained essentially the same. A plaintiff who seeks to recover 
for the negligent infliction of emotional distress must meet the 
requirements of Purcell, as recycled in Okrina and Stadler. The 
plaintiff must be in the zone of danger and suffer emotional 
distress as a result of fear for her own safety, and the distress 
must be manifested by physical injury. The zone of danger 
standard can be abandoned only if the plaintiff either suffers 
physical injury as a result of the defendant's negligence, or 
proves that the defendant committed a separate tortious act. 
There are unanswered questions concerning the right to re-
cover for negligently inflicted emotional distress. Will the 
supreme court abandon the zone of danger requirement and if 
not, the physical injury requirement? Will the court adopt 
some version of the "direct victim" recovery rule that has been 
adopted by the California Supreme Court? 
The law concerning intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress is also limited. The supreme court, historically cautious 
in determining whether recovery should be allowed in cases 
involving claims for emotional injury in absence of preceding 
physical harm, adopted the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress in Hubbard. However, the court, although 
concerned about the possibility that independent claims of 
mental anguish may be speculative and therefore likely to lead 
to fictitious allegations, imposed significant limitations on the 
right to recover, limitations that the lower courts have followed 
stringently. 
There is some confusion concerning the application of the 
standards, leaving the courts open to criticism that the guide-
lines for the recovery of damages for emotional harm have 
been administered too rigidly, particularly in the case of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, a problem that is resolv-
able by a return to the basics established in Hubbard and Pikop. 
Given the limitations on the right to recover for emotional 
distress, it is important to determine whether there are alterna-
tive avenues of recovery that avoid those limitations. The dis-
tinctions between cases where intentional infliction of 
emotional cases have been unsuccessful and cases where the 
HeinOnline -- 19 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 97 1993
1993] EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 97 
same sort of emotional injury has been compensable by con-
necting it to some other underlying tort, highlight the impor-
tance of scouring the law to determine whether there are other 
theories that will support recovery of damages for emotional 
harm. Those alternatives do exist and in fact will provide a 
superior basis for obtaining compensation for emotional in-
jury, unless the Minnesota law with respect to intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress is significantly liberalized. 
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